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Article 
The Other Half of Regulatory Theory 
HANOCH DAGAN & ROY KREITNER 
Theories of regulation conceptualize the task of the agencies of the modern 
state in terms of the public interest. Regulatory agencies, in this conventional view, 
should ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources and secure distributive 
justice and democratic citizenship. Many agencies nicely fit this aggregative mold, 
but not all. A significant subset of the regulatory practice—the second half of the 
universe of regulation—deals with a different task: delineating the terms of our 
interpersonal transactions, forming the infrastructure for our dealings with other 
people, both private individuals and firms. This Article focuses on these relational 
regulators, which regulatory theory marginalizes or neglects.  
Descriptively, we show that many agencies are best understood as devices that 
supplement or supplant the role of courts in addressing horizontal, rather than 
vertical or aggregative, concerns. In other words, many of the practices and 
operational codes and sensibilities of these agencies are best conceptualized as 
responses to the horizontal challenges of the creation of the infrastructure for just 
interpersonal relations in core social settings, such as the workplace or the market. 
Normatively, we argue that the seeming consensus among theorists of both 
regulation and private law, in which these tasks belong to judges rather than 
administrators, is misguided. In many contexts—increasingly prevalent in 
contemporary society—agencies, rather than (or in addition to) courts, may well be 
the appropriate institution, or at least an additional institution, for the articulation, 
development, and vindication of our interpersonal rights. 
The analysis yields the initial steps towards a more complete theory of 
relational regulatory agencies that makes sense of their core practices. We 
demonstrate the regulatory implications—in both substance and form—of 
undertaking the role of establishing and maintaining the infrastructure for just 
interpersonal interaction, and we advance a preliminary account of the regulatory 









INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 607 
I. SITUATING THEORY: REGULATION, PRIVATE LAW, 
INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................ 612 
A. REGULATORY THEORY AND AGGREGATIVE AGENCIES.................. 614 
B. PRIVATE LAW THEORY AND THE CONTINGENCY OF ADJUDICATION .... 
  .................................................................................................. 618 
C. HAYEK’S OBJECTIONS ................................................................. 623 
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF RELATIONAL REGULATORS ............... 629 
A. RELATIONS FOR REGULATION ...................................................... 629 
B. TWO EXAMPLES .......................................................................... 631 
C. THINKING HORIZONTALLY........................................................... 642 








343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   78 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
 
The Other Half of Regulatory Theory 
HANOCH DAGAN & ROY KREITNER * 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory theory suffers from a fundamental misconception at its core. 
The misconception lies in an overly narrow idea of the purposes that 
regulatory agencies should pursue, and thus a constricted view of the very 
rationality of regulation. According to the misconceived but dominant view, 
regulatory agencies must advance the public interest which they can and 
should see only through aggregates. Attention to the relations among 
individuals, or relational justice, is considered beyond their purview. The 
corollary of this dominant view is that relational justice among individuals 
is a matter for courts, adjudicating traditional private law disputes. The 
institutional division of labor implied by such a view may be a convenient 
heuristic, but it is a serious mistake for anyone seeking a compelling account 
of how many regulatory agencies actually function. It is an even deeper 
mistake for a broad account of how law contributes to generating the 
infrastructure for just interpersonal interactions in modern states. 
Correcting the common misconception requires a multi-level inquiry, 
which we pursue in the following pages. The inquiry yields, eventually, an 
enriched theory of regulation which recognizes that regulators rightfully 
pursue both collective goals and interpersonal justice. It overcomes an 
unrealistic vision of the institutional division of labor between courts and 
agencies, and it begins to develop the tools for improving regulatory 
practice. It points the way towards understanding the creation and 
development of the infrastructure for just relationships as a joint venture 
between legislatures, agencies, and courts. In particular, it highlights 
                                                                                                                     
* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation & Director of the Edmond J. 
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Cohen, Nestor Davidson, Mike Dorf, Avihay Dorfman, Mark Geistfeld, Talia Gillis, David Gilo, Andrew 
Gold, Andrew Halpin, Alon Harel, Ron Harris, George Hay, Swati Jhaueri, Ehud Kamar, Greg Keating, 
Greg Klass, Stephan Landsman, Mitch Lasser, Eliav Lieblich, Odette Lienau, Doreen Lustig, Yoram 
Margalioth, James Penner, Ariel Porat, Jeff Rachlinski, Aziz Rana, Annelise Riles, Arthur Ripstein, Issi 
Rosen-Zvi, Peter Schuck, David Schorr, Stewart Schwab, Cathy Sharkey, Tony Sebok, Steve Shiffrin, 
Joe Singer, Jed Stiglitz, Suzanne Stone, Zhong Xing Tan, Karen Tani, Chantal Thomas, Gerhard Wagner, 
Ernest Weinrib, Ben Zipursky, Neta Ziv, and workshop participants at Cornell, NYU, and Tel-Aviv, as 
well as at the Annual Conference of the Israeli Association of Private Law, the Roundtable of the 
Singapore Symposium on Legal Theory and the Western University Tort Law Research Group Public 
Lecture for helpful comments, and to Ahuva Goldstand and Ori Shprach for excellent research assistance. 
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elements of the regulatory toolkit for participation in the creation of a just 
social infrastructure. 
The ground level of our analysis relies primarily on straightforward 
empirical observation, and the discrepancy between such observation and 
the misconceived view of institutional division of labor. Concretely, this is 
simply a matter of searching out the sources of the norms that ground our 
routine interactions. Private law entitlements delineate the terms of 
interpersonal transactions, forming the infrastructure for our dealings with 
other people. Those rights have a range of sources; more specifically, the 
entitlements relevant to interpersonal relations comprise norms with 
different institutional pedigrees. Some are doctrines familiar from casebooks 
in first year private law courses: trespass; nuisance; the duty to pay damages 
upon breach, and the limitation of that duty by doctrines of foreseeability 
and mitigation; the requirement of returning mistaken payments; etc. Many 
more, however, are the products of regulatory agencies: the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines the duties of employers 
to provide safe workplaces;1 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) determines which lending practices are unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive;2 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determines rights and 
obligations of collective bargaining;3 the Office of Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity (FHEO) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) determine prohibitions on discrimination;4 the Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) establishes quality grading and a code of fair 
business practices, including dispute resolution;5 and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) sets safety standards and labeling requirements for 
food and pharmaceuticals.6 
This list is meant to be exhausting, not exhaustive. Examples of 
regulatory agencies acting to create or maintain the infrastructure of daily 
interaction in market societies are legion—we could not hope to offer a 
comprehensive list. We have limited our attention here to major 
administrative agencies; the claim of regulatory contribution to the 
infrastructure of interpersonal interaction could easily go further. For a 
simple example, consider the effect of zoning on both real property 
                                                                                                                     
1 See infra text accompanying notes 127–33 (describing OSHA’s feasible risk reduction test). 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 167–70 (describing CFPB’s authority and definition for finding 
an act or practice abusive). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 205–07 (describing employees’ right to unionize and bargain 
with their employers). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 211–13 (describing the EEOC’s and FHEO’s interpersonal 
focus within their respective agencies). 
5 See sources cited infra notes 186–87 (discussing horizontally oriented agencies including the 
USDA: specifically, the way in which the USDA as an agency takes care to address complaints, and how 
the PACA division of the USDA resolved approximately 3500 claims in the past three years). 
6 See sources cited infra note 236 (discussing hybrid agencies (the FTC, SEC, and FDA) and their 
aggregative and horizontal features).  
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transactions and, even more straightforwardly, the reciprocal rights and 
duties of members of a local community. A similar point can be made, for 
example, regarding state housing codes that not only regulate building safety 
but set the baseline entitlements tenants have a right to expect when they 
rent apartments from landlords.7  
In short, the system of entitlements that undergirds interpersonal 
transactions is a joint product of traditional common law rules and 
agency-developed regulatory norms. Our observation here is not a 
discovery, but more of a reminder. Whatever one thinks of its history, this is 
relatively obvious as a matter of description: modern market societies 
structure the interactions among individuals in thickly populated forests of 
legal norms. It is difficult to imagine a modern society without such 
infrastructure. And because of how pervasive regulatory norms are in this 
infrastructure, it seems to us unwieldy and unproductive to imagine them as 
mere appendages to the system of entitlements. 
The next level of inquiry moves us from the descriptive to the normative 
realm. Some versions of private law theory claim that common law rules 
should be the exclusive backdrop for interactions among individuals. Those 
views place judges at the center of responsibility for interpersonal justice, 
and legislation or regulation on the distant periphery as alien add-ons or 
late-coming policy interventions.8 More importantly for our purposes, the 
same presupposition underlies the dominant voices in regulatory theory, 
which is our focus here. For the most part, regulatory theory views the task 
of regulatory agencies as serving a collective, as a collective: they should 
ensure the efficient allocation of scarce resources, or secure distributive 
justice, democratic citizenship, and the like. Thus, regulators have no 
business in securing relational justice; focusing on the horizontal dimension 
—the interactions among individuals—would distract them from the big 
picture and thus undermine their core responsibility.9  
Taken to its logical limits, this view in regulatory theory questions the 
very rationality of some core instantiations of regulatory practice. To take 
one example that we develop at greater length below, consider OSHA’s 
feasible risk reduction requirement, which is expressly based on a direct 
relation between particular employers and employees, and explicitly rejects 
aggregate cost-benefit analysis. Some theorists take this as evidence that 
                                                                                                                     
7 Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 571 (2017) (explaining 
the authority of local agencies and the type of functions these agencies have). 
8 This conceptualization of the legal terrain is implicit in most private law casebooks as well as in 
prominent theoretical accounts that take the category of private law seriously (viz., corrective justice and 
civil recourse). See infra text accompanying notes 46–47, 75–92 (discussing the conventional 
understanding of the domain of private law and Friedrich Hayek’s critique of the regulatory state). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 20–24 (discussing the conventional, strictly aggregative, 
understanding of regulation). 
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OSHA’s practice is normatively deficient and even unintelligible.10 Cass 
Sunstein, for example, argues that because “one OSHA regulation protects 
a large number of lives at relatively low cost, while another regulation 
protects a small number of lives at a relatively high cost,” OSHA is probably 
unconstitutional.11 When theory is at a loss to explain core features of 
practice, it is not necessarily a good sign for theory. In fact, once we develop 
a richer theory of the purposes of regulatory agencies and account for their 
role in generating an infrastructure for just relations among individuals, 
regulatory rationality is rescued, as theory and practice align. 
Interestingly, much private law theory and most regulatory theory share 
a double mistake. First, they both assume that what they perceive as the core 
activity of each sphere (relational entitlements for private law theory; 
collective or aggregative conceptions of the public interest for regulatory 
theory) exhaust the types of reasoning that should govern these practices. 
Second, they both assume that different institutions (judges alone for private 
law theorists; regulators alone for regulatory theorists) always work with 
wholly different logics and without shared purposes. This conventional 
wisdom divides the world much too neatly, and ignores too much necessary 
complexity. 
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we develop the argument that the 
conventional view, in which relational concerns are alien to the mission of 
the state’s regulatory apparatus, is misguided. In many contexts—
increasingly prevalent in contemporary society—agencies, rather than (or in 
addition to) courts, are appropriate institutions for the articulation, 
development, and vindication of our interpersonal rights. Administrative 
regulation is often useful and sometimes indispensable for establishing and 
maintaining the infrastructure for interpersonal interaction in complex 
societies. 
This means that our relational infrastructure, often termed private law, 
is and should be a product of a joint venture of common law courts and 
administrative agencies. To the extent that private law theory tends to be 
court-centric, it will not be capacious enough. At the very least, a singular 
focus on courts limits the institutional and procedural imagination as to how 
law contributes to our interpersonal, horizontal relationships. Releasing 
private law theory from this stricture is an important task, but beyond our 
current concerns.12 What is important for us here is another detrimental 
effect of this mistake. Presupposing that the regulatory apparatus should be 
dedicated solely to aggregative tasks impedes the vision of regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
10 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 
707, 709 (2010). 
11 Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (2008).  
12 See Hanoch Dagan, The Challenges of Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67, 
82–84 (Kit Barker et al. eds., 2016) (introducing the challenge of incorporating regulatory means into 
private law). 
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theory, causing it to miss the potential that agencies wield in the 
interpersonal realm.  
In Part II, we turn our attention to agencies with direct bearing on 
horizontal relations among individuals, including firms. These agencies 
fulfill indispensable tasks in sustaining many of our interpersonal 
interactions and securing their compliance with the injunctions of relational 
justice. Our particular focus is on the legal reasoning that guides these 
agencies when they create, develop, or apply the norms that shape 
entitlements. Working for the most part inductively, we show that regulatory 
practice has more in common with traditional private law reasoning than has 
been hitherto appreciated. Our analysis of these horizontally-oriented 
agencies reveals how many of their practices and operational codes and 
sensibilities are in fact adapted to their task of providing the infrastructure 
of just relations. One way to put this conclusion is that it offers a 
mirror-image of the familiar legal realist insight as to the public dimensions 
of private law.13 
Certain aspects of both the substance and form of these agencies, which 
may seem off track from an aggregative perspective, become 
straightforward once conceptualized as responses to the horizontal 
challenges of participating in the creation of the infrastructure for just 
interpersonal relations in core social settings, such as the workplace or the 
market. Our evidence relies heavily on the way regulatory agencies (OSHA, 
EEOC, NLRB) generate and maintain the baseline for just work 
relationships.14 Indeed, much of the legal infrastructure of the 
employer-employee relationship in contemporary settings in which law 
takes certain contracting options off the table and uses other, more subtle 
techniques to empower employees is not judge-made, but rather the product 
of legislators and regulators. 
These and other examples we discuss in Part II allow us to sketch a 
preliminary prototype of relational agencies, thus filling the gap between 
regulatory theory and the practice of agencies on the ground. Our account 
offers practical payoffs: as usual, reflection on what we already do is useful 
because articulating our premises can help organize our practice and push it 
better to deliver on its implicit promise. Elucidating the relational role of 
agencies refines its performance: if we better understand regulatory 
purposes, we can fine-tune practice to fit those purposes. In addition, the 
analysis has the potential to replace intuitive but sometimes loose 
discussions of regulatory attention to vulnerable populations with a better 
developed normative account of baseline entitlements required for 
interpersonal relations to proceed on a just basis. Furthermore, our survey of 
                                                                                                                     
13 Cf. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1959) (emphasizing 
the prevalence and importance of public policy considerations in tort cases affecting group interests). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 119–34, 139–46, 148 (discussing OSHA as an example of an 
agency that pursues relational justice in the workplace). 
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the various techniques horizontally-oriented agencies utilize offers a 
preliminary account of a regulatory toolkit suited for this task, which may 
facilitate some cross-fertilization. Injecting these lessons into regulatory 
theory may also allow skeptics (and skeptical agencies)—who do not yet 
pay attention to the interpersonal dimension of regulation even where it 
arguably exists and exerts practical force—at least to consider taking this 
task seriously. 
I. SITUATING THEORY: REGULATION, PRIVATE LAW, INSTITUTIONS 
There are many institutions that engage in creating, applying, 
interpreting, and developing the law. In our less careful jurisprudential 
moments, we are liable to conflate three different features of this 
multiplicity: the type of norm in question; the institution paradigmatically 
responsible for making decisions about a given type of norm; and the kinds 
of considerations that ought to inform the decision making process. Simple 
examples may help clarify: norms of constitutional design (bicameralism or 
a unified legislature? federal or unitary structure? official religion or 
separation of church and state?) are promulgated by specialized procedures, 
typically constitutional conventions that aspire to express an idealized 
version of the will of the polity.15 Transnational soft law (e.g., Basel Accords 
on standards of capital adequacy for banking) is formulated by international 
bodies relying on expertise in coordination. Local land use norms (where 
can I park? at what hour will the bars close?) are created by local 
governments, animated by intimate knowledge regarding the preferences of 
the affected public. 
Conflating the type of norm, the responsible institution, and the kinds of 
considerations to be weighed often supplies a convenient shorthand. At 
times, however, the shorthand undermines our sensitivity to the overlaps, 
crossovers, and possible mismatches between institutions and their bases for 
decisions. In private law theory, the issue usually surfaces as a conflict over 
whether courts deciding private disputes should consider distributive justice 
or community concerns of any kind.16 The jurisprudential concern, however, 
is more general. Comparative institutional analysis should certainly be 
                                                                                                                     
15 In their creation and subsequently in their interpretation and application by constitutional courts, 
the idealized will of the polity supplies the dominant considerations. 
16 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 742–43 (1999) 
(proposing that “progressive distributive considerations” be added to the regulatory takings doctrine); 
Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1857, 1858–59 (2004) (arguing for cost distribution among those benefiting from underlying risk in 
accidental injury tort law); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 
563, 571–72 (1982) (describing how distributive rules of contract and tort systems are not always 
motivated by distributive intentions). Cf. Donal Nolan, Tort and Public Law: Overlapping Categories?, 
135 L.Q. REV. 272 (2019). 
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mindful of the relative strengths and weaknesses of varied institutions in 
terms of both their legitimacy and their competence in evaluating different 
kinds of considerations. At the same time, we should remember that 
identifications between institutions and considerations are partial, 
contingent, and instrumental.  
Our point is straightforward and descriptively not particularly original. 
Students of regulatory agencies have long been aware of the role agencies 
often play in creating the ground rules for market interaction and their 
intermediate enforcement functions that require adjudication-like 
consideration of private equities.17 However, the acknowledgment that at the 
level of thick description agencies form a crucial part of the private law 
system has not translated into a theoretical account of how aggregative and 
horizontal considerations interact, or how such interaction might affect our 
view of the task of the regulator. 
Indeed, even if one assumes the usefulness of a shorthand that connects 
private law and courts, administrators should often weigh considerations of 
relational justice. There is no need to pitch battle over the proposition that 
courts are paradigmatically suited to adjudicating claims of interpersonal 
justice while regulators are paradigmatically geared toward aggregative 
visions of the public interest. It is enough to note that at times, agencies are 
a crucial instrumentality in laying the groundwork for relational justice. The 
input of administrative determinations into the interpersonal regime of tort 
law via the doctrine of negligence per se provides a straightforward example 
for that.18 When those conditions hold, regulators should weigh 
considerations of relational justice as animating features of their practice.  
Relational regulators, who are the heroes of this Article, share with 
judges the common purpose of prescribing the legally acceptable terms of 
                                                                                                                     
17 This was a central theme of legal process scholarship of the late 1950s, which we take to be the 
modern starting point of comparative institutional analysis. For two central examples produced in the 
1950s but published much later, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 9–12, 60–64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) and Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 374–76 (1978). 
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010) (discussing how the importance of negligence per se has increased with greater statutory and 
regulatory controls); see also, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 253 (2d ed. 2016) 
(discussing “standard limits on application of statutory standards as negligence per se”); JOHN C. P. 
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: TORTS 155–56 
(2010) (describing “four qualifications” to negligence per se). The regulatory compliance defense and 
the federal preemption doctrine may also be related, but they raise further complexities that are beyond 
the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
957, 996 (2014) (describing the relationship between the regulatory compliance defense and negligence 
per se); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 480–81 (2008) (discussing the theoretical considerations of negligence per se within 
the preemption debate).   
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   85 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
614 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
interpersonal interaction.19 Rather than a strict division of labor, we believe 
that the institutional overlap between judges and regulators that typifies the 
law in action is normatively the more attractive route.  
A. Regulatory Theory and Aggregative Agencies 
1. Regulation Without Relation 
Unfortunately, relational regulators have no place in current regulatory 
theory. Whereas there is no one canon of regulatory theory, the (oftentimes 
implicit) conventional wisdom underlying the otherwise competing 
accounts of the normative structure of the modern-state’s regulatory 
apparatus is deeply aggregative. Law writ large, in this view, is not limited 
to the private law tasks of securing individual property and facilitating 
interpersonal transactions. Instead, our more general normative ordering 
extends beyond private law and resorts to “the collectivist alternative” 
offered by public law in order to secure “outcomes consistent with economic 
welfare” or more generally with “the public interest.”20 As this proposition 
suggests, theorists (like policymakers and practitioners) may not agree on 
the specific goals that the regulatory enterprise should pursue, but there is 
no disagreement that only “public interest goals” can legitimate the 
regulatory “collective measures.”21  
The least controversial set of justifications for regulation includes 
various types of market failures, that is: cases in which for reasons like 
monopolies or anti-competitive behavior, externalities or public goods, or 
informational inadequacies, an “uncontrolled marketplace” is likely to “fail 
to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public interest.”22 But 
at least some of the existing literature does not stop there. Regulation, in this 
view, should not be limited to address market inefficiencies and maximize 
consumer welfare. Rather, it should also seek to promote other social 
rationales, such as protecting rights, securing distributive justice, or 
facilitating social solidarity and deliberative citizenship.23 Pluralist theorists 
                                                                                                                     
19 The responsibility to relational justice of these regulators does not imply of course that they are 
(or should be) free from the constraints of the statutory schemes that govern their operation and the 
democratic oversight and political compromises that typically accompany these schemes. We do not 
claim that the deference to the expertise of “relational justice professionals” should be different from that 
which is duly accorded to other agency professionals.    
20 ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29 (1994). 
21 Id.  
22 ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 
15 (2d ed. 2012). 
23 See, e.g., id. at 22–23 (discussing the purpose of “further[ing] social objectives”); TONY PROSSER, 
THE REGULATORY ENTERPRISE: GOVERNMENT, REGULATION, AND LEGITIMACY 18 (2010) (describing 
“four different rationales underlying regulation”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 55–63 (1990) (discussing the “Functions of Regulatory 
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of regulation argue accordingly that although identifying the dominant 
rationale for a given regulatory measure is important in order to “choose the 
regulatory weapon best suited to the problem at hand,” many “regulatory 
programs rest upon not one but several different rationales.”24 Importantly, 
many students of regulation recognize the constitutive or foundational role 
that regulation often plays in the creation and maintenance of markets: “It 
determines the shape and indeed the possibility of the market somewhat as 
DNA structures a life form and is prerequisite to such forms.”25 
None of what we argue in this Article should be read as challenging the 
obvious significance of the public interest—however it is defined—in any 
assessment of the legitimacy or the performance of regulatory agencies. But 
we nonetheless insist that this aggregative conception of the regulatory 
apparatus of the modern state is incomplete. Some theorists of regulation 
may, at least implicitly, realize the void which this Article seeks to fill. One, 
somewhat attenuated, version of such awareness is the reference—under the 
heading of “market failures”—to parties’ unequal bargaining power and to 
collective action problems as justifications for regulation.26 However, these 
references don’t seem to take these phenomena as inherently problematic, 
but only as possible hindrances to the efficient operation of the market.27 A 
more significant acknowledgment of the conceptual gap appears where 
authors recognize that regulation may be required not to address a failure of 
the market, but rather the absence of a market, or of an effective market. 
Regulatory law “often serves to constitute market relations, to provide the 
frameworks for rights and processes that allow markets to work, and to 
protect markets from fragmentation.”28 Similarly, at times regulatory 
agencies are said to engage in “market-making, market-moving, 
market-levering, and market-preserving.”29 
2. Public Interest Agencies 
The focus of the prevailing regulatory theories on the public interest 
nicely fits many agencies, whose mission is—at least in their current 
                                                                                                                     
Statutes,” including “Public-Interested Redistribution” and fulfilling “Collective Desires and 
Aspirations”). 
24 STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 34–35 (1982). 
25 Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as 
Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 55 (2014). 
26 See, e.g., respectively, BREYER, supra note 24, at 32; SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49–52 
(discussing unequal bargaining power and collective action problems). 
27 A vivid demonstration of this is at times manifested where the adjective unequal or the term 
unequal bargaining power appear in quotation marks. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 24, at 32. 
28 See, e.g., BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 15, 22 (discussing the effects of regulatory law on 
markets). 
29 Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25, at 56. 
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incarnation30—clearly aggregative. The previous mission of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, was “to ensure that: 
all Americans are protected from significant risks to human health and the 
environment where they live, learn and work.”31 The current EPA website 
has replaced that sentence with a stated mission to ensure that “Americans 
have clean air, land and water,” which portrays a similar public interest role, 
albeit less directly.32 Likewise, “the mission of the Antitrust Division [of the 
Department of Justice] is the promotion and maintenance of competition in 
the American economy”;33 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) helps “fund 
national priorities ranging from education to defense”;34 and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is in charge of ensuring the safety 
and soundness of banks and savings associations in order to “promote[] a 
vibrant and diverse banking system that benefits consumers, communities, 
businesses, and the U.S. economy.”35 
The public missions of these, and other,36 agencies explain¾as 
canonical regulatory theory prescribes¾the significance of aggregating 
social costs and benefits, and thus their heavy reliance on “a thorough and 
careful economic analysis” as “an important component” of their rulemaking 
process.37 They likewise justify the public-regarding focus on distributive 
justice so that, for example, “everyone enjoys: the same degree of protection 
from environmental and health hazards, and equal access to the 
                                                                                                                     
30 As will become clear by the end of this Article, the remainder of this Section should not be read as 
an endorsement of the purely aggregative self-understanding of these agencies. 
31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2020 NAT’L ENVTL. JUST. CONF. & TRAINING PROGRAM, 
https://thenejc.org/?sponsor=u-s-environmental-protection-agency (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). For an 
archived version of the EPA website from January 19, 2017, see Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-
do_.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
32 Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
33 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL I-2 (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL]. 
34 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2016: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. of Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. 156 
(2016) (statement of Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, in the form of a report titled “Congressional 
Justification for Appropriations and Annual Performance Report and Plan FY 2016”). 
35 About Us, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://occ.treas.gov/about/index-about.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
36 Such as the Federal Communications Commission whose public mission is to “make available . . 
. to all the people of the United States . . . rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service.” FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2015–2018, at 1 (2015), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/strategic-plan-2015-2018.pdf. 
37 Overview of Economic Analysis at the EPA, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/overview-economic-analysis-epa (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
See also, e.g., Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
569, 569 (2013) (discussing the role of economic analyses in financial regulation).  
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decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, 
learn, and work.”38 
The concentration of these aggregative agencies on the public interest 
dictates their more specific goals as well as their priorities. Thus, the EPA’s 
strategic plan declares that “[w]e must focus on the environmental and 
public-health issues that matter most to the American people,” and 
accordingly mentions five strategic goals: “Addressing Climate Change and 
Improving Air Quality”; “Protecting America’s Waters”; “Cleaning up 
Communities and Advancing Sustainable Development”; “Ensuring the 
Safety of Chemicals and Preventing Pollution”; and “Protecting Human 
Health and the Environment by Enforcing Laws and Ensuring 
Compliance.”39 The EPA channels “federal enforcement resources” along 
similar lines, so as to maximize “the level of public health protection,” which 
means that it is committed “to the largest most complex cases that have the 
biggest impact,” even though that necessarily implies “doing fewer cases 
overall.”40 Similar aggregative thinking underlies the priorities of other 
agencies, such as the Antitrust Division and the OCC.41 
Finally, the public missions and goals of this type of agencies42 also 
explains the dominance of their vertical perspective. This perspective, in 
turn, explains the heavy reliance of these agencies on criminal 
enforcement.43 It also implies the ancillary, indeed strictly instrumental role, 
of individual complaints: aggregative agencies typically44 do not seek to 
resolve specific disputes but rather use complaints as merely one source of 
information that can help identify major trends or systemic problems.45 
                                                                                                                     
38 Funding for Communities, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
39 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2014–2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 1, 4 (2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/epa_strategic_plan_fy14-18.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA STRATEGIC PLAN]. 
40 Id. at 38.  
41 See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 33, at I-2 (promoting “competition in the 
American economy”); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 1 
(2019), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-ep-
bsp.pdf (promoting “fair access to financial services,” among other goals).  
42 See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. 
43 See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 33, at I-2 (discussing purpose including 
“[g]eneral criminal . . . enforcement of the Federal antitrust laws”); EPA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 
39, at 38–40 (discussing an objective to “pursue vigorous . . . criminal enforcement” for environmental 
safety); Criminal Investigation (CI) At-a-Glance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/criminal-investigation-ci-at-a-glance (discussing mission of “investigating 
potential criminal violations of the” Internal Revenue Code). 
44 The OCC is an exception. See HelpWithMyBank.Gov, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Aug. 
2019), https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/index.html (discussing how the OCC addresses each individual 
complaint). 
45 See, e.g., Consumer Complaint Center, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining how individual 
complaints are used to “identify trends and track the issues”); Report Violations, DEP’T JUST., 
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B. Private Law Theory and the Contingency of Adjudication 
1. Private Law Considerations 
One popular view of private law presents a mirror-image of this 
conventional association of regulation with the public interest. Private law, 
in this view, is defined as concerning “the rights which, one against another, 
people are able to realise in courts.”46 This court-centric view of private law 
is a direct manifestation of the conventional equation of private law with 
common law adjudication. It implies, for example, that workers’ 
compensation schemes, which substitute administration for adjudication, 
should not be deemed extensions of tort law; the shift from the domain of 
one-to-one litigation before a judge to the administrative apparatus implies, 
in other words, a jurisdictional transfer of authority from private law to 
public law.47 
Indeed, like the prevailing theories of regulation, this account of private 
law conflates types of norms, legal reasoning, and institutions. But the 
feature that makes private law a meaningful legal category is not 
institutional.48 Rather, it lies in the types of considerations that supply the 
justifications of its substantive norms. Thus, the conception of private law 
that guides us here appreciates the significance of having a body of law that 
specifically governs our interpersonal, horizontal relationships, as opposed 
to our interactions as subjects of the state or as co-citizens. The orientation 
of our law toward us is qualitatively salient: it makes a difference whether 
we are addressed as bearers of material needs, as parts of a comprehensive 
unit of joint responsibility, or—as it is with private law—as persons with 
projects.  
Recognizing the significance of private law along these lines need not 
be confused with an exercise of separation, which looks for necessary and 
sufficient differences between private and public law that would make them 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining how violation reports 
are handled).  
46 Peter Birks, Introduction to 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, at xxxv, xxxvi (Peter Birks ed., 2000). 
47 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 (2010). 
See also, e.g., Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1119 (2013) (contesting the conflation of private law with regulations of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the Federal Trade Commission). 
48 Conceptualizing private law as a distinct legal category may seem normatively empty and a mere 
distraction for scholars, such as lawyer-economists, who perceive private law as just one option for the 
state to enact and administer rules that incentivize people to act in line with the general welfare. When 
posed at a level of theoretical purity, this yields a reductionist view of private law that marginalizes or 
completely ignores private law’s distinctive value, thus rendering the subject-matter of our inquiry a 
priori hollow. But as is often the case, the lawyer-economists have things half-right. They miss the boat 
by assuming that there are no normatively significant features that ground private law; on the other hand, 
they touch on an important insight in recognizing that there may be varied institutional tools geared 
toward common outcomes. 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   90 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
2020] REGULATORY THEORY 619 
mutually exclusive. Some private law theories pursue this strategy, but we 
find it unsatisfying. That strategy assumes that law can and should structure 
our interpersonal relationships with no account for our collective goals, such 
as distributive justice (which focuses on justice in holdings), democratic 
citizenship (which seeks to eradicate hierarchies in our relationships qua 
citizens), or efficiency (which is concerned with the size of our welfarist 
pie).49 
A different conception of private law, which one of us has elaborated 
and defended elsewhere,50 is dramatically different. Its point is neither 
doctrinal separation nor strict division of labor. Rather, the importance of 
private law relies on the freestanding significance of the social, a realm 
always in interaction with, but not reducible to, the public.51 Recognizing 
the value (and potential threat) of our horizontal interactions in the array of 
social spheres governed by private law—such as family, work, home, 
community, and commerce—implies that goals like efficiency, democratic 
citizenship, and distributive justice, while always potentially relevant, 
should not exhaust private law’s normative concerns. Private law is a 
meaningful legal category quite apart from its contribution to these public 
purposes. That meaning lies in delineating what people owe each other in 
the framework of social interaction. Private law undergirds our interpersonal 
obligations as private individuals rather than our obligations as co-citizens.52 
It supplies a set of considerations that focus precisely on such social contact, 
and the dominance of those considerations is private law’s distinguishing 
feature.53 More than any other part of the law, private law sets the conditions 
of legitimate interaction among individuals; it underpins (an important 
subset of) our quotidian horizontal relationships as persons.54 
Resisting private law’s reductionist understanding as exhausted by 
public considerations does not imply that it ought to be analyzed solely as a 
stronghold of individual independence and formal equality, while leaving 
the task of realizing the commitments to individual self-determination and 
substantive equality to public law. This understanding of private law seems 
conventional, but the division of labor on which it relies cannot withstand 
                                                                                                                     
49 Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Postscript to Just Relationships: Reply to Gardner, West, 
and Zipursky, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 268–69 (2017). 
50 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397 
(2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships] (distinguishing private law as governing 
interpersonal relationships, whereas public law governs the relationships of individuals with the 
government); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework, 
37 LAW & PHIL. 171, 173–74 (2018) (arguing that, charitably interpreted, private law vindicates relational 
justice); Dagan & Dorfman, Postscript to Just Relationships, supra note 49, at 261 (elaborating upon the 
distinction between public and private law through a focus on the normative status of private law). 
51 Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1398. 
52 Id. at 1397. 
53 Id. at 1399. 
54 Id. at 1398. 
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critical scrutiny.55 Any polity that takes seriously the commitment to 
individual self-determination (and not merely independence) and to 
substantive (rather than merely formal) equality cannot make these values 
irrelevant to our interpersonal relationships. Quite the contrary: these values 
are just as crucial to our horizontal interactions as they are to our vertical 
ones, although they entail different implications in these different 
dimensions. 
Private law is actually committed to enhancing a capacious vision of 
autonomy, rather than merely to safeguarding independence; and it does not 
content itself with formal equality, but rather aims at positively establishing 
our substantive equality.56 Numerous doctrines of private law—including 
veteran common law rules that require potential tortfeasors to accommodate 
the relevant constitutive features of their victims,57 help solve collective 
action problems,58 or oblige recipients of mistaken payments to reverse 
mistakes for which they have no responsibility59—are straightforward 
implications of the injunction of reciprocal respect to self-determination and 
substantive equality. These and many other examples support the 
interpretation of private law as the realm of relational justice.60 
This charitable reading of private law is controversial, but that 
controversy does not undermine our point here. Critics may offer competing 
interpretations of the interpersonal responsibilities entrenched in private 
law.61 Fortunately, arbitrating such controversies is unnecessary for our 
purposes because nothing in what follows hangs on the endorsement of this 
particular account. All that is needed for the purposes of this Article is the 
modest, quite banal, proposition that private law includes much more than 
duties of abstention; that the law of our interpersonal interactions as 
individuals is also the law of our interpersonal responsibilities towards one 
another.62 
2. Beyond Adjudication 
Courts are often useful for the development and implementation of 
private law. Common law judges indeed carried much of this burden 
historically. Friends of the common law tradition celebrate its “Grand 
Style,” described by Karl Llewellyn as “a functioning harmonization of 
vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose, 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. at 1408. 
56 Id. at 1397. 
57 Id. at 1431–38. 
58 Id. at 1445–51. 
59 Id. at 1456–58. 
60 See id. at 1430–59 (applying principles of relational justice in the fields of property and contracts). 
61 Id. at 1401. 
62 See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 69–70 
(2020).  
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of measure with need,” mediating between “the seeming commands of the 
authorities and the felt demands of justice.”63 This mode of decision making 
renders adjudication a particularly hospitable arena for the complex task of 
fashioning and refashioning the legal infrastructure of interpersonal 
relationships. It invites judges to engage in what Benjamin Cardozo called 
an “endless process of testing and retesting.”64 It encourages them to shape 
and reshape law “close and contemporary” to the human problems they deal 
with, taking benefit from “the discrimination necessary for intimacy of 
treatment.”65 And at the same time, its typical piecemeal, gradual mode of 
operation retains the common law’s loyalty to the two important aspects of 
the rule of law: the requirement that law be capable of guiding its subjects’ 
behavior, and the prescription that law not confer on officials the right to 
exercise unconstrained power.66 
There is another reason the connection between private law and 
adjudication seems natural. While the ultimate result of a system of private 
law is a comprehensive scheme of entitlements governing our interpersonal 
interactions that prescribes our primary rights and duties, private law’s 
straightforward means of enforcement entails the arming of rights-holders 
with the power to decide how to respond to infringement of their rights as 
well as the standing to instigate a complaint.67 Court proceedings are 
sensibly perceived as the obvious venue for this exercise: adjudication as a 
forum is specifically designed to assess the parties’ behavior vis-à-vis their 
interpersonal rights and obligations as well as to refine the rules that 
delineate these rights and obligations to begin with.68 Furthermore, even 
though the yield of the process does not perfectly mirror these rights,69 these 
gaps do not undermine the sense in which courts’ rulings and orders serve 
                                                                                                                     
63 KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 37–38 (1960).  
64 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921). 
65 Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 74 (1928). 
66 See Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1889, 1898–1905 (2015) (conceptualizing Legal Realism as accepting the stabilizing force of 
doctrinal categories while allowing for judges and legislators to occasionally rethink conventional 
doctrine). 
67 This point is (over-)emphasized by proponents of both corrective justice and civil recourse 
theories. See, e.g., respectively, ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 271–75 (2016) (detailing the need 
for rights-holders to actively pursue corrective justice through adjudication; GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, 
supra note 62, at 111–46 (defending the principle of civil recourse). 
68 This in any event does not imply that adjudication by aggrieved parties is the signature of private 
law, since it also typifies large swaths of public law. See Avihay Dorfman, Private Law Exceptionalism? 
Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse, 35 LAW & 
PHIL. 165, 177–85 (2016) (discussing adjudication by aggrieved parties for infringement upon their 
constitutional rights). 
69 See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1727 
(2012) (delineating two types of damage awards: those that confirm existing duties to others, and those 
that create duties to others). 
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as focused responses to plaintiffs’ complaints given remedies’ participation 
in the constitution of rights and not only their enforcement.70 
These are weighty reasons for the association of private law with 
adjudication, and more generally, of the importance of our access to courts. 
But they do not imply that private law only appears, thrives, or survives 
when run by judges. Quite the contrary, these advantages of adjudication are 
contingent upon a certain adjudicatory tradition and upon a set of 
background empirical assumptions and normative conjectures. Court-centric 
private law may thus be suboptimal in its own terms, namely, judged 
vis-à-vis its ideal of relational justice. This may be the case for the obvious, 
but practically important, reason that the existing private law institutions of 
adjudication (alternative dispute resolutions included) fail to respond 
effectively enough to the demand for dispute resolution,71 or that their 
response is disturbingly affected by the respective parties’ ability to pay or 
other asymmetrical limitations of the access to justice.72 It may also derive 
from more general considerations.  
Complying with private law’s underlying commitment to structure our 
interpersonal relationships so that they are governed by reciprocal respect to 
individual self-determination mandates the provision of an infrastructure for 
a secure marketplace within which effective choices can be made. This is a 
mission that often requires private law to recruit an administrative apparatus, 
supplementing or even supplanting courts.73 The fundamental institutional 
                                                                                                                     
70 See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE 
LAW THEORY 144–60 (2013) (positing, through a discussion of the relationship between rights and 
remedies, that legal realism views remedies as a core component of rights). 
71 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
119, 129, 131 (2002) (“A recent study utilized state court data to demonstrate that the use of particular 
processes, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), does not correlate with shortened disposition 
times, while the factors that do so correlate, such as forum locale and case category, are simply beyond 
the reach of process-oriented reform.”); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion 
Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 527, 529–30, 557–58 (1989) (detailing the various measures used to 
respond to the problem of litigation delay and noting that ADR rules do not have significant effect). 
72 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–5 (2004) (highlighting the gap between 
rhetorical commitments concerning access to justice and the true reality that millions of Americans lack 
equal access); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98, 103–04, 121–22 (1974) (describing how the advantages of “haves” 
over “have-nots” is perpetuated and augmented by wealth and power).  
73 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 1–2 (1996) (discussing “the pervasiveness of regulation in early American versions 
of the good society”); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643, 643 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 
2008) (explaining that, in nineteenth-century America, at the state level, “America had little 
‘administration’ beyond local officials; not high administrators but judges supervised the work of local 
officialdom”); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory 
Substitutes or Complements?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1706–07, 1710, 1734, 1739 (2016) (arguing that 
administrative agencies have emerged as a fourth branch of government, which has had widespread 
impacts on tort law); see also, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory 
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limitations of the judiciary in a complex and interconnected environment 
imply that fulfilling private law’s relational task may necessitate regulatory 
underpinning. Such regulation may be necessary for ensuring the generality 
of legal prescription, for maintaining the required technological expertise for 
legal decision making, and for the targeting of systemic market failures that 
can hardly be addressed on the transactional level. It may also be necessary 
in order to establish effective tools for proactive (as opposed to reactive) ex 
ante guarantees of just interpersonal relationships in various social settings 
and to ensure that they are sufficiently predictable so as to effectively guide 
people’s behavior as required by the rule of law. Finally, these reasons for 
handing over part of private law’s mission to regulators are augmented once 
we recall that the challenge of private law is not to resist the influence of our 
public commitments (that is, of values such as distributive justice, 
democratic citizenship, or aggregate welfare), but rather to respond to the 
injunctions of the maxim of just relationships, while remaining sensitive to 
these important public concerns.74 
Indeed, although adjudication is often a perfectly sensible mechanism 
for private law to employ, private law can be, is, and sometimes should also 
be made, applied, interpreted, and developed in other arenas.  
C. Hayek’s Objections 
Our main focus in this Article is on the implications of this proposition 
on the theory and practice of certain agencies, those that are properly 
analyzed as indeed responsible, at least in part, for carrying out private law 
tasks. But before we proceed in this direction, it may be advisable to consider 
possible objections to the placement of such authority in the hands of 
regulators, as opposed to judges. While such objections may come from 
various directions, they all converge into the powerful critique of the 
regulatory state by one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the common 
law, Friedrich Hayek.  
Hayek insisted that private law (or law more generally) properly so 
called is judge-made law, and is thus distinct from both statutes and “special 
commands or permissions by administrative agencies.”75 His argument for 
this conceptual distinctiveness and normative superiority of the common law 
is broad and complex; but for our purposes it is helpful to disentangle it into 
three separate propositions (which he combines). First, the common law 
                                                                                                                     
State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401, 401–03 (2003) (proposing a new economic theory that addresses 
how private litigation, government regulation, and a combination of the two are used to secure property 
rights).  
74 See Dagan, supra note 12, at 83 (noting that the purpose of autonomy-based private law is to 
refine interpersonal concerns, not to eliminate all public concerns). 
75 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 127, 132–33, 136 (1982); 
2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 34 (1982). 
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enjoys a form of generality unavailable to the regulator.76 Judge-made law, 
on this account, is not “invented or designed” in order to serve a specific 
purpose; rather, it is a set of abstract and universal “rules of just conduct,” 
sharply contrasted with the “discrimination and discretion” that the 
operation of administrative agencies necessarily involves.77 These rules 
govern the behavior of persons towards others; they are applicable “to an 
unknown number of future instances”;78 and they contain “prohibitions 
delimiting the boundary of the protected domain of each person (or 
organized group of persons).”79 They thus “enable an order of actions to 
form itself wherein the individuals can make feasible plans” and effectively 
pursue them.80 
Second, the common law, in sharp contrast to legislation or regulation, 
is spontaneous and organic. It is neither “the product of anyone’s will,”81 
nor is it “something the mind could deliberately create”;82 rather, it 
“spring[s] from the articulation of previously existing practices” or 
“customs.”83 The common law is a product of a “spontaneous process of 
growth”84 of a set of “practices on which the everyday conduct of the 
members of the group [is] based,”85 resting on “a diffused opinion of what 
is right.”86 Judge-made law is based on “the experience gained by the 
experimentation of generations,” which “embodies more knowledge than 
was possessed by anyone”; and it is “discovered either in the sense that 
[judges] merely articulate already observed practices or in the sense that [it 
includes] required complements of the already established rules.”87 
Finally, judge-made law is independent of the capricious will of 
legislators, regulators, or the interest groups that drive them. The common 
law is “determined by courts independent of the power which organize[s] 
and direct[s] government.”88 Judges “are not normally concerned with 
relations of command and obedience, only such actions of individuals as 
affect other persons.”89 They serve to “maintain and improve a going order 
                                                                                                                     
76 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 86 (“[L]aw which . . . emerges from the judicial 
process is necessarily abstract . . . . ”). 
77 Id. at 85, 86, 138. 
78 2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 35. 
79 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 122. 
80 Id. at 85–86; see also 2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 36–37 (describing 
the function of rules of just conduct).   
81 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 85. 
82 Id. at 97. 
83 Id. at 85–86. 
84 Id. at 88. 
85 Id. at 96–97. 
86 Id. at 95. 
87 Id. at 119, 123. 
88 Id. at 85. 
89 Id. at 101. 
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which nobody has designed, an order that has formed itself without the 
knowledge and often against the will of authority.”90 Thus, their product—
the common law—can serve “as a barrier to all power,” rather than “an 
instrument for the use of power.”91 It is again the mirror image of the product 
of legislation and regulation, whose “whole history” is one “of continuous 
struggle to prevent particular groups from abusing the governmental 
apparatus for the benefit of the collective interest of these groups.”92  
* * * 
We are far from willing to sign on to Hayek’s depiction of the law, which 
has little basis in history and strikes us as vulnerable to compelling critique, 
both logical and normative. Nonetheless, Hayek’s drawing of sharp 
analytical boundaries between regulation and adjudication proves useful in 
clarifying thought regarding the relative place of these institutional 
mechanisms.93 Each of these three propositions involves an important lesson 
for the making of private law, but none of them implies the exclusivity or 
even hegemony of judges in carrying out this enterprise.94 
Hayek’s first proposition echoes to some extent our conception of 
private law as the law of just interpersonal relationships conducive to self-
determining individuals. But it misleadingly tightens the connection 
between private law and judge-made law by offering two indefensible 
oppositions between adjudication and administrative agencies regarding 
abstraction, on the one hand, and pure prohibition on the other.  
Regarding abstraction, Hayek presents the products of adjudication as 
universal, abstract rules and the workings of administration as necessarily 
about particularistic purposes. But this must be wrong, because the 
distinction between general rulemaking and the pursuit of particular 
purposes does not track the institutional divide between judges and 
administrators.95 The rule of law requirement of generality, on which this 
first opposition relies, means that legal rules must be applicable to all their 
addressees equally rather than singling out particular groups for special 
                                                                                                                     
90 Id. at 118–19. 
91 Id. at 92. 
92 2 HAYEK, MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 6. 
93 Our critique of Hayek’s rigid distinctions will become clear presently. For an account with deep 
alliances to Hayek’s own, but which draws many of the same distinctions as matters of degree, see 
WALTER LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY 282–93 (1937). For an 
analysis of the affinities between Lippmann and Hayek and of Lippmann’s influence on German ordo-
liberalism, see ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE 
DEPRESSION 57–78 (2012). 
94 Cf. Sharkey, supra note 73, at 1733–34 (noting that courts must oversee a newer common law 
regime that utilizes input from federal regulatory agencies). 
95 To be fair, Hayek elsewhere acknowledges as much, in a discussion of administrative bodies that 
exercise limited discretion and apply general rules, with examples drawn from the supply of a monetary 
system, the setting of weights and measures, land registration (including building codes), and education. 
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 222–28 (1960). 
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treatment.96 This entails that there should be rules that are more abstract than 
their particularistic instantiations,97 and is thus, as Hayek himself 
acknowledges, “a matter of degree.”98 Identifying the right degree of 
abstraction is a complex question, whose answer may well change across 
legal fields. In any event, there is no a priori reason to suppose that 
administrative agencies are less likely than judges (or constitutionally 
unable) to respect the requirement of generality or are more amenable than 
their brethren and sistren on the bench to the ad hoc application of unbridled 
discretion. In fact, there are good contextual reasons to suppose that agencies 
are usually more sensitive to the requirement of generality. Beyond 
particular and contingent examples, both forms of law-making include 
constraining institutional doctrines—such as the requirement that judges 
justify their decision in universalizable terms or the due process 
prescriptions of agency fair procedure—that seek to ensure this important 
aspect of the rule of law.  
Regarding the negative or prohibitory character of private law rules, 
Hayek’s purported opposition between adjudication and administrative 
agencies is no more convincing. Common law rules, like many rules set by 
administrative agencies, often lay out general requirements for anyone 
interested in pursuing a given activity.99 Further, as we have indicated above, 
the common law, pace Hayek, is not only about prohibitions, but rather 
includes positive duties of interpersonal accommodation. These duties, as 
we further clarified, are essential if private law is to fulfil the role Hayek 
ascribes to it of facilitating people’s ability to be the authors of their own 
lives.100  
                                                                                                                     
96 Id. at 226. 
97 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 48 (1964) (noting the need for general principles in 
legal systems).  
98 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 140. See also HAYEK, supra note 95, at 226 
(explaining that rather than making distinctions between different people, there should be more general 
rules). 
99 For a simple example, consider the requirement that one undertaking a dangerous activity employ 
due care. But even common law rules as basic as those of contract formation impose positive 
requirements on those seeking to perform legally valid acts. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, 
THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 37–39, 45–46 (2017) (exploring the modest affirmative 
interpersonal duties at the foundation of contract law). The characterization of the common law as 
inherently prohibitory in nature is untenable. 
100 See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing relational justice and the idea that significant representation 
is a step on the way to helping people view the system as one of their own authorship). If one assumes, 
as Hayek sometimes does, that the only legitimate aim of the law is to “ascertain the boundary of the 
protected domain of each [person] and thus to distinguish between the meum and the tuum,” 1 HAYEK, 
RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 107–08, then private law (or law more generally) might include 
only prohibitions. But this assumption presupposes a private law limited to the protection of property, 
with no substantive account of the power-conferring aspect of private law without which the law of 
contract—and, in fact, of property—is scarcely imaginable. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Markets for 
Self-Authorship, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577, 580–83 (2018) (noting how markets contribute to 
self-authorship and recognizing property and contract law as “power-conferring legal doctrines”). Such 
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Hayek’s second proposition also contains a grain of significant truth, 
insofar as it emphasizes the role of experience in the development of law. At 
least since Holmes’s famous quip that experience is the life of the law, it 
would be difficult to argue otherwise.101 Hayek correctly claims that learning 
from experience is one of the pillars of the common law tradition, which 
perceives law as a great human laboratory continuously seeking 
improvement,102 and his turn to custom as a source of law has romantic 
appeal as well as some genuine common law pedigree.103 It pays, however, 
to distinguish between the appeal to experience on the one hand, and the 
reliance on custom and especially spontaneous order, on the other.  
As far as reliance on experience is concerned, there is little reason to 
think it is the exclusive province of adjudication. Administrative regulation 
is generally as much a product of experience as judge-made law, and often 
built upon more comprehensive reflection on such experience. It is 
particularly salient for sophisticated administrative apparatuses, which 
include complex mechanisms of experimentalism and learning.104 In short, 
if we emphasize the experiential aspect of Hayek’s second proposition, it is 
supportable on its own, but not as an argument to distinguish adjudication 
from administrative regulation.  
Hayek’s appeal to custom and spontaneity may have a tighter link to 
adjudication,105 but it is unattractive normatively, for a number of reasons. 
First, custom is limited in its capability to adapt, while, as Hayek recognizes, 
sometimes the common law needs “to deal with altogether new problems,” 
or start anew reversing its path after reaching “an impasse” or realizing 
“undesirable consequences.”106 But even with regard to problems that are 
                                                                                                                     
a conception cannot plausibly serve as private law’s foundation not only due to its normative failures, 
but also, as we argued above, because it is simply too distant from existing doctrine to supply a plausible 
account of the practice.  
101 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64 (describing the common law tradition as one that 
invites fashioning and refashioning). 
103 See KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790-1900: 
LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 25 (2011) (noting that there are two “temporalities” in thinking 
about law: the historical and the customary). 
104 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (exploring how democratic experimentalism increases 
administrative efficiency and heightens administrative accountability); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–5 (1992) 
(describing the positive qualities of responsive regulation); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55, 79, 83 (2011) 
(discussing experimentalism’s similarities to responsive regulation and its mechanisms for achieving 
learning and coordination).  
105 There is, of course, some debate on the question whether and to which degree the common law 
follows custom. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Hayek, The Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 79, 94 (2004) (agonizing over the departure of the common law from custom).   
106 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 88, 100. 
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not new, it always pays to be cautious about custom, notwithstanding the 
rhetorical appeal of what is portrayed as “bottom-up” law.107 Preliminarily, 
custom is notoriously difficult to pin down as a source of law, especially as 
an independent source of law distinct from reason.108 Additionally, 
customary norms are often prone to inefficiency owing to pervasive 
information problems and strategic behavior.109 More importantly, Hayek’s 
Darwinian “evolutionary functionalism” is normatively odious: many 
“stable tyrannies” are “ideal-typical instances of Hayekian spontaneous 
social order,” and it is bewildering why these, and other similarly unjust but 
both spontaneous and stable orders, deserve to be celebrated and 
entrenched.110 Indeed, the appeal to the supposed spontaneity of custom 
betrays a deafness to the typical ways power cloaks itself in tradition, 
naturalizing relations whose basis is arbitrary or violent.  
Finally, like Hayek’s first two propositions, his third is also important, 
but again does not justify the conceptual separation he seeks to establish. 
Hayek’s concern that administrative agencies and legislatures are subject to 
pressure from interest groups seeking to capture private benefits at the 
expense of the public good has by now become conventional wisdom for 
students of regulation and legislation.111 But most of them do not give up on 
the idea that administrators and legislators can properly pursue public 
interests. The reasons vary. Some point to the contribution of administrative 
law, which evolved dramatically since Hayek’s skeptical account was 
written, in curbing such influences.112 Others remind us that questions of 
                                                                                                                     
107 Hayek himself expressed skepticism about customary communities which have been celebrated 
in recent times by authors such as Robert Ellickson and Robert Cooter. See Robert W. Gordon, Hayek 
and Cooter on Custom and Reason, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1994) (contrasting Hayek’s views about 
customary communities with those of Cooter). 
108 See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1991) (discussing the “somewhat unclear mingling” of custom and reason 
as sources of law). 
109 See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1713, 
1725–26 (1996) (exploring the problem of inefficient norms that result from information problems and 
strategic behavior).  
110 John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice, 92 ETHICS 73, 83 (1981).   
111 For classic formulations, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1, 144 (1965); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4 (1971) (advancing the argument that “regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”). For a review of the field, 
see David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 31–32 (2013) 
(seeking “more rigor in how we think and talk about the idea of . . . [the] process by which policy is 
directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of a regulated industry”). 
112 See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF 
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2007) (discussing the decision making environment of government 
agencies and arguing that the regulatory government can advance general interests); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001) (defending administrative law due to the requirements placed on 
administrators to “be both transparent and contemporaneous”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 
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institutional competence (and thus of expected performance) as well as of 
institutional legitimacy are always comparative,113 and that Hayek himself 
acknowledged occasions in which “whole sections of the established system 
of case law” turn out to be “unjust” and must be dramatically revised given 
“the greater influence that certain groups like landlords, employers, 
creditors, etc., had wielded on the formation of the law.”114  
We do not purport to resolve these comparative institutional questions 
here of course, partly because we doubt that they are amenable to one right 
answer across the wide range of thematic variation and the broad spectrum 
of institutional cultures of the judiciary and the public administration in 
different jurisdictions. Fortunately, no such answer is needed for our 
purpose. Hayek’s concerns of bias and capture are valid vis-à-vis all the 
carriers of law’s power. So, nothing in our account implies that the 
regulatory schemes that supplement or supplant courts in carrying out 
private law’s interpersonal mission should be exempt from these concerns. 
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF RELATIONAL REGULATORS 
A. Relations for Regulation 
Establishing and maintaining a just scheme of interpersonal 
relationships has never been a simple matter. Modern societies are complex, 
and setting up an effective legal infrastructure that vindicates mutual 
obligation is a daunting challenge. It is thus increasingly difficult to expect 
courts, whose modus operandi is reactive and whose perspective and 
information on key categories of relationships we have—with employers, 
landlords, banks, and the like—are framed by specific disputes they 
encounter, to face these challenges on their own. Given the comparative 
institutional advantages of legislatures and administrative agencies on these 
fronts, it should be neither surprising nor objectionable to observe their 
heavy participation in these core tasks of private law, either in 
supplementing or in supplanting courts.115  
The responsibility of securing just social relationships is different from 
the responsibility of serving the interest of the public as a whole. “[I]t is one 
thing for the state to respect its constituents as genuinely free and equal 
                                                                                                                     
70 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 649 (2018) (analyzing how administrative lawmaking “is more responsive to 
public interests”). 
113 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (advancing the argument that “comparative institutional 
analysis” is predicated on a comparison of decision making alternatives).  
114 1 HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 75, at 89, 141. 
115 See JOSEPH W. SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE 
SUBPRIME CRISIS 74, 125 (2015) (noting that “minimum standards” for relationships are based on several 
lawmaking procedures including: court interpretations, statutes, administrative rules, and state 
regulations). 
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persons; it is quite another to live in a society that expects individuals 
themselves to comply with the ideal of just relationships between free and 
equal agents.”116 Taking this responsibility seriously requires the pertinent 
legal actors—such as the regulators that we study here—to think 
horizontally and to adjust their substantive, structural, and procedural 
features to the task at hand.  
Indeed, regulation often plays an important role in supplying the 
infrastructure for just relations among individuals. In so doing, it does not 
and need not rely exclusively on aggregative considerations. As we have 
seen, regulatory theory typically assumes such an exclusive aggregate focus, 
which fits a subset of the administrative apparatus: the agencies which carry 
a predominantly public task.117 Our goal in what follows is to show that other 
agencies—the other half of the regulatory universe—are better analyzed 
differently.118 We do not deny that they may also be justified in public law 
terms; we do not argue, in other words, that the original justifications for 
their establishment, which are mainly aggregative,119 are sheer cover-up 
triggered by the need to justify federal jurisdiction in compliance with the 
Commerce Clause. Rather, we claim that this aggregative perspective 
accounts for only part—and not necessarily the most significant part—of the 
picture. Therefore, if not supplemented with a developed horizontal 
perspective, the aggregative account generates a partial, even distorted, 
understanding of this important subset of our regulatory universe.  
We begin with a sketch of two agencies: the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB). Our aim is not to offer a comprehensive account of these 
complex agencies, but rather to show that at least some of their tasks and the 
means they use in order to attain them are best understood in relational terms. 
The main—or at least one important—goal of both agencies is the 
construction and maintenance of just interpersonal relationships in the 
respective social spheres they regulate. Accordingly, quite a few of the 
features of their modus operandi are attuned to this relational mission.  
                                                                                                                     
116 Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 50, at 1460. 
117 See supra Section I.A.2. 
118 We thus share the critique—premised on different reasons from ours—of existing regulatory 
theory for being insufficiently attuned to the heterogeneity of observed regulatory practice. See Cary 
Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
1217, 1219, 1235–37 (2002) (arguing that cognitive limitations impact regulatory policies and judgments 
about regulatory policies); Steven P. Croley, Beyond Capture: Towards a New Theory of 
Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 50, 57, 59–60, 64 (David Levi-Faur ed., 
2011) (arguing that capture theory might be too general to provide practical insight for real-world policy 
issues). 
119 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012)) (referring to aggregative justifications and purposes for federal 
workplace health and safety policies). 
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We use these two examples to venture a preliminary account of 
horizontal agencies, which take their responsibility to relational justice 
seriously. One takeaway of this account is to resist the “public law 
reductionism” that increasingly strict and not sufficiently discriminating 
cost-benefit analysis requirements of administrative agencies may 
generate.120 To reiterate: we do not imply that cost-benefit analysis should 
be irrelevant to the more relational agencies we study; the aggregative effect 
of all agency regulations surely implies that their welfarist implications are 
pertinent even with respect to these agencies. But we insist that the closer 
we come to the pole of the relational agency, the more troubling it is if 
cost-benefit analysis overshadows or even erases the private law sensibilities 
we identify.  
B. Two Examples 
1. OSHA 
Abstractly analyzed, there is nothing unique in job-related injuries. Like 
other types of harms, some of these injuries are properly analyzed as 
violations of relational duties, which means that the responsibility for their 
prevention and the costs of their occurrence should not be allocated to the 
worker, but rather to another person, notably her employer. The adjudicatory 
process, namely, the common law of torts, offers a straightforward way to 
implement this proposition. Of course, this conclusion is merely a shorthand 
for a slightly subtler point. The costs of injury are not allocated to the 
particular worker injured on the job, but rather spread among the 
stakeholders in the activity more generally: employers or insurers cover the 
immediate costs of an injury that befalls the particular worker; workers (by 
sacrificing some of their wages) or consumers (by paying higher prices) or 
shareholders fund the coverage. Losses are shared among a group of people 
who benefit from the activity.121  
But tort law is not essential for this task, and the shift to other means of 
securing compliance with these duties—for pragmatic or other reasons of 
the kind we have discussed earlier—does not imply a repudiation of this 
                                                                                                                     
120 For a (rather modest) attempt to ameliorate this concern, see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. 
Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 
1866–68 (2016). 
121 The underlying point here is that the duties of the employer to the employee are part of a wider 
net of interpersonal justice claims. A web of benefitting parties shares responsibility for the costs of 
injuries. But the collective responsibility for the ultimate cost does not undermine the special role of the 
employer, as the person in control of the conditions of work, in attending to care for the prevention of 
injury. Creating an economic incentive for the employer to generate safe working conditions is one way 
of making her focus on an interpersonal duty, but it is not necessarily the most effective way to ensure 
that focus. More direct duties that solve information uncertainties might be better suited to the task, and 
their accompaniment by insurance schemes would not undermine the core responsibility at stake in 
relational terms. 
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injunction of relational justice. Indeed, relational justice need not object to 
alternative schemes, such as workers’ compensation schemes, as long as 
they make some room for the types of legal doctrines—for example, 
injunctive relief and punitive damages for intentional misconduct—that 
ensure compliance with the employer’s duty of care.122  
Our analysis of OSHA falls within this broad framework. To be sure, 
our point is not that the scheme prescribed by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 mimics the results of traditional negligence law. Quite 
the contrary, part of the point of this Act is to generate measures that 
strengthen employers’ ex ante compliance with this interpersonal duty, a 
duty that instantiates a legitimate relation between particular employers and 
particular employees.123 Indeed, the common law of torts, with its traditional 
requirement of a completed wrong, is inapt for the task because it cannot 
properly respond to the irreparable harms at hand and workers’ 
compensation schemes do not obviate this difficulty. In particular, no award 
of money damages can restore victims of wrongful death their lost means 
(life), and that is also true of injuries such as mangled limbs or blindness. Ex 
ante regulation of risk is, at least in principle, the proper response to this 
predicament.124  
Accordingly, the OSHA regime structures the relationships between 
employers and employees by ensuring the foundational status of employees’ 
right to safety and health.125 These deviations from the common law of torts 
do not imply that the OSHA regime is divorced from private law’s relational 
focus. Rather, they mean that even though its form is regulatory, this regime 
is in tune—in fact, more in tune than its adjudicatory counterpart—with a 
focus on what relational justice requires.126  
                                                                                                                     
122 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1436–37 (noting the continued 
applicability of traditional legal doctrines—like injunctive relief and punitive damages—in workers’ 
compensation cases, which count as relationally just in terms of the employer-employee interaction).  
123 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 6-1 (2015), 
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-159.pdf [hereinafter OSHA FIELD 
OPERATIONS MANUAL] (regarding the General Penalty Policy, noting penalties to employers as incentive 
for preventing or correcting violations voluntarily); NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, 
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 458 (rev’d ed., 1996) (discussing the OSH Act’s 
goal in providing safe workplaces, by establishing and enforcing standard governing the work 
environment).  
124 The qualified language of the text derives from the fact that a comparative institutional analysis 
may show that an ex post workers’ compensation (or tort) approach is in fact more effective in securing 
employees’ fundamental right to safety and health. 
125 See CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 94 (1986) 
(“[OSHA] promised all workers a minimum level of health and safety regardless of the extent to which 
they were politically and economically organized, their income, or their market position.”). 
126 This does not imply, of course, that OSHA works perfectly. Indeed, like many (most) other 
complex bureaucracies, it suffers both from delays and from distortions, due to the influence of interest 
groups. See id. at 205 (discussing the failure of OSHA, including susceptibility to business groups’ 
mobilization); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-330, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: 
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This relational perspective is key to important aspects of both the 
substance and the form of the OSHA regime. It is most clearly manifested 
substantively in OSHA’s prescription of feasible risk reduction.127 OSHA 
“requires the elimination of ‘significant’ risks, when [those risks] can be 
eliminated without threatening the long-run health of the activity to which 
the risks belong.”128 As Gregory Keating explains, such feasibility analysis 
“looks to achieve the lowest level of risk practically”—that is: 
technologically and economically—“attainable, not the level of risk that 
minimizes the combined costs of injuries and their prevention.”129 This 
analysis renders intelligible what Sunstein and other spokespersons of the 
conventional accounts of regulatory theory find so puzzling.130 Indeed, 
OSHA’s feasibility test makes perfect relational sense. Private law’s 
normative underpinnings of reciprocal respect for self-determination and 
substantive equality entail an asymmetrical treatment of physical harms and 
financial costs.131 This means that where “the essential conditions of 
effective agency”132 of the employees are at stake, risk creators should 
indeed be required to “press precaution beyond the point of marginal 
cost-justifiability.”133  
Another way to view this situation is to shift attention momentarily away 
from an individualized risk creating decision. What is at stake is a regime 
level rule, a baseline of the interpersonal interaction between employers and 
employees. OSHA’s baseline of relational justice reflects a commitment 
regarding what kinds of considerations can actually enter the aggregate 
                                                                                                                     
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES LENGTHEN OSHA’S STANDARD SETTING 4, 7–9, 12, 37–38 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589825.pdf (noting the involvement of various interest groups in the 
rulemaking process, and reporting on the protracted time periods of developing and issuing new or 
updated health and safety standards). 
127 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (“The Secretary . . . shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity . . . .”). There are, to be sure, also aggregative concerns that affect OSHA’s regime, as—for 
example—where it incorporates concerns of the economic burden on small businesses. See Occupational 
Safety & Health Admin., Small Business, DEP’T LAB., https://www.osha.gov/smallbusiness/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2019) (demonstrating availability of resources and information, specifically for small business 
employers). 
128 Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 
231, 233 (2018). 
129 Id. at 231. 
130 See Masur & Posner, supra note 10, at 658, 668, 679, 704, 706-07, 709; Sunstein, supra note  
11, at 1410–11. 
131 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 50, at 1397, 1418, 1424, 1432 (contrasting 
private law’s valuing of self-determination and substantive equality that implies the asymmetrical 
treatment of physical harms and financial costs with their symmetrical treatment under the economic 
analysis of law). 
132 Keating, supra note 128, at 200. 
133 Dov Waisman, Reasonable Precaution for the Individual, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 653, 670 
(2014).  
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welfarist analysis in the first place;134 and it also recognizes that relational 
justice need not imply that concerns of general welfare are irrelevant. This 
is why its feasibility requirement does not apply to insignificant risk: such a 
“background level of risk” is “worth bearing,” as Keating notes, because 
eliminating all discernible risk “requires the elimination of all discernible 
activity,” which would be “a cure worse than the disease it treats.”135 
Furthermore, although OSHA does not establish a regime of one-to-one 
litigation,136 the relational foundation of the OSHA regime can easily be 
traced in many features of its form. OSHA defines its “general” mission as 
the assurance of “safe and healthful conditions for working men and 
women,” where its own role is one of “setting and enforcing standards and 
providing training, outreach, education and compliance assistance,” while 
“employers are responsible for providing a safe and healthful workplace for 
their workers.”137 This division of labor is not one whereby the state 
commandeers the support of employers to enhance its public goals; rather, 
it rests on the typical private law relational logic:138 “Because employers 
control the conditions of employment, the onus of protecting workers from 
occupational disease and injury was to rest with them as well.”139  
Indeed, as the “general duty” clause of the OSH Act prescribes, each 
employer is obligated “to furnish to each of his employees employment and 
a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
employees.”140 This relational emphasis accounts for the rough 
correspondence between the list of employers’ responsibilities and that of 
                                                                                                                     
134 A capacious view of cost benefit analysis would seek to limit this type of consideration to a bare 
minimum, insisting that only harms/benefits that are unquantifiable in principle escape the analysis. 
Unsurprisingly, such a view often accords with the (philosophically dubious) claim that values such as 
“equity” or “dignity” are quantifiable in principle. For an analysis that usefully distinguishes between 
what may be impossible and what is merely difficult to quantify, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 104–
08 (2016). 
135 Keating, supra note 128, at 248–49. 
136 To be sure, complaints by workers or their representatives are important triggers for inspections, 
in which case they also have some rights of participation and information. See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ALL ABOUT OSHA 16 (2018), 
https://www.osha.gov/publications/all_about_osha.pdf [hereinafter ALL ABOUT OSHA] (“Workers only 
have the right to challenge the deadline by which a problem must be resolved.”). But the process is 
administrative and “[w]hen an inspector finds violations of OSHA standards or serious hazards, OSHA 
may issue citations and fines. A citation includes methods an employer may use to fix a problem and the 
date by when the corrective actions must be completed.” Id.; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS 13 (2014), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf (describing 
OSHA protocol for violations).  
137 ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 4.   
138 ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 184.  
139 Id. at 92. See also PAUL A. ERICKSON, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY 3 (1st ed.1996). 
140 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). 
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employees’ rights, as well as for the fact that the OSHA regime does not 
cover self-employed workers.141 
In addition, the pursuit of relational justice is not limited to the substance 
of its safety standards. OSHA’s focus on constructing just workplace 
relationships implicates the way it complies with the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s requirement of stakeholders’ participation in its rulemaking 
procedure:142 both employers and labor representatives may recommend that 
OSHA initiate standards,143 and, in any event, OSHA conducts public 
hearings or roundtables in which representatives of both parties can provide 
their input.144 Furthermore, two representatives of each side sit on the 
National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health 
(NACOSH), which advises the secretaries of labor and health and human 
services on occupational safety and health programs and policies.145  
The connection between process considerations and relational justice is 
complex, and the democratizing element of OSHA’s advisory committee 
may be seen as a mediating feature. On the one hand, if one believed that 
relational justice could be deduced from pure reason, the advisory board 
could comprise a single philosopher. But under modern industrial 
conditions, safety policy seems more like a hybrid category where a range 
of arrangements that might accord with relational justice merit 
consideration. Reasoning about those arrangements is not a mere exercise in 
expressing preference or exerting interest group power, but situated 
perspectives will make a difference for choices. Under these conditions, 
allowing some significant representation is a step toward allowing 
participants to understand the system as one of their own authorship. This is 
also part of the infrastructure of just relations. 
The same relational justice rationale also explains “OSHA’s priority 
system for conducting inspections” which “is designed to allocate available 
OSHA resources as effectively as possible to ensure that maximum feasible 
protection is provided to working men and women.”146 It also nicely 
explains, indeed justifies, OSHA’s authority to seek a restraining order if it 
finds “conditions or practices” which “could reasonably be expected to 
cause death or serious physical harm before normal enforcement procedures 
                                                                                                                     
141 ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 8–10. 
142 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
143 ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 12.   
144 Id. at 12–13.   
145 National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety & Health, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nacosh.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
146 OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 123. Specifically, inspections are initiated 
without advance notice, and based on the following priorities: imminent danger, catastrophes, worker 
complaints and referrals, and follow-up inspections. See Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) Inspections, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf. 
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could eliminate the hazard.”147 Perhaps the starkest example of this rationale 
is the regulation providing workers a right to refuse hazardous work if “the 
condition clearly presents a risk of death or serious physical harm, there is 
not sufficient time for OSHA to inspect, and, where possible, a worker has 
brought the condition to the attention of the employer.”148 While its 
applications are not necessarily straightforward, the principle is a clear case 
of taking a particular activity off the bargaining table. In that sense, it 
establishes a relational justice baseline that structures the rest of the parties’ 
interaction.  
 Finally, the relational rationale underpins OSHA’s outreach priorities, 
that is: its focus on “vulnerable, hard-to-reach workers in dangerous jobs to 
enhance their knowledge about their rights and the hazards they face” as well 
as on “temporary workers” and “limited English proficiency workers—a 
population that typically experiences a higher rate of injuries, illnesses, and 
fatalities in the workplace.”149 OSHA’s mission of constructing just 
workplace relationships is also clear from the extension of its reach to 
foreign workers who are thereby also encouraged “to exercise their rights 
under occupational safety and health laws.”150 Outreach has rarely been the 
focus of scholars dealing with OSHA.151 It is, however, a telling example for 
our claim. When people affected by the ground rules of interaction are 
unaware of their rights, the very basis of just relationships is threatened. 
Outreach is crucial for establishing the basic conditions for just work 
relationships. Further, it is particularly inaccessible to courts; it may be a 
byproduct of sensational litigation now and then, but it cannot be 
systematically pursued except by an administrative agency. OSHA’s 
                                                                                                                     
147 ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 96. 
148 ALL ABOUT OSHA, supra note 136, at 20. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 1 (1980) 
(supporting OSHA’s attempt to force accommodation of workplace conditions to workers’ known 
susceptibilities); ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 425–26, 441 (discussing “employees who 
face exclusion from the workplace . . . because of their presumed susceptibility to health hazards known 
to be present in the workplace”). 
149 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN, FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 31, 33–34, 
https://archive.org/details/Department-of-Labor-Strategic-Plan-2014-2018 (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
150 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., LETTER OF ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES CONCERNING 
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTIONS APPLICABLE TO FILIPINO WORKERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2012), https://www.osha.gov/international/docs/loa_philippines.pdf. OSHA signed similar 
agreements with Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, The Philippines, and China. OSHA International, OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,  https://www.osha.gov/international/index.html [https://perma.cc/YHA7-
F78Y] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). These agreements contain no commitments of the other countries 
regarding American workers. They thus lack any statist rationale and can best be explained as a 
manifestation of the foreign workers’ interpersonal human rights. See generally Hanoch Dagan & Avihay 
Dorfman, Interpersonal Human Rights, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361 (2018). 
151 For the exception that proves the rule, see Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479 (2009). 
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outreach regime recognizes the importance of creating the conditions for just 
relationships by taking on the responsibility for generating an informed 
workforce. 
3. CFPB 
Our second example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), was only recently established as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act 
reforms of the financial services regulatory system152 (and currently 
occupies some news headlines).153 Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the 
CFPB within the Federal Reserve System and assigns to it “rulemaking, 
enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial 
products and services, as well as the entities that sell them.”154  
The CFPB is a perfect example for our purposes because the financial 
institutions over which it has authority were actually regulated and 
supervised prior to its establishment. But both the attention and the expertise 
of the banking regulators, who had the statutory powers to protect consumers 
at that time, were focused on their other mission, which they perceived to be 
primary,155 namely “ensuring that institutions are managed in a safe and 
sound manner so as to maintain profitability and avoid failure.”156 Safety and 
soundness regulation is of course justified from the perspective of the 
general welfare. However, the dominance of this public perspective implied 
the “subordination of consumer protection to bank profitability,” which 
meant that except in the “most egregious” cases, regulators tended to look 
favorably upon even “unfair, deceptive, and abusive” bank practices as long 
                                                                                                                     
152 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 12 U.S.C. § 
5491 (2012). 
153 See Ian Wren, Clash for Control of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Heads to Court, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601965298/legal-battle-over-who-
runs-consumer-bureau-continues (describing the 2018 controversy over who got to run the CFPB). 
154 DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2014), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf. To be sure, with respect to large depository institutions, 
the CFPB now has the primary consumer compliance supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking 
authorities. Regarding smaller ones, the prudential banking regulators hold a significant portion of the 
supervisory and enforcement powers. On the other hand, the CFPB may also regulate nondepository 
financial institutions: providers of private student loans; providers of payday loans; entities that engage 
in mortgage-related activities; and other institutions, which it considers to be large participants in a 
consumer financial market or ones that engage in conduct that pose risks with regard to the provision of 
consumer financial products or services. Id. at 13, 16.  
155 See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 330–31 (2013) (describing how the primary motivation of bank regulators was 
profitability over protecting consumers). 
156 CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 2. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “did have a consumer 
focus,” but it had no “deep expertise in consumer finance.” Id. at 8; Levitin, supra note 155, at 331. 
Furthermore, its statutory authority “prevented it from conducting ex ante supervision of nondepositories 
and from regulating depositories altogether.” CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 8. 
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as they were indeed profitable.157 This failure, which triggered the 
establishment of the CFPB,158 can be interpreted simply as mistaken 
application of welfarist criteria by underestimating costs that are widely 
spread; and it was probably also that. But it also meant that prior to the 
CFPB, there was no room to consider concerns of relational injustice.  
The CFPB, to be sure, does not (and should not) eliminate the obvious 
significance of public concerns in the regulation of financial institutions.159 
But it does give center stage to relational considerations,160 and in this 
respect it is similar to OSHA. Although its focus is on financial products, 
rather than health and safety, and its beneficiaries are consumers,161 rather 
than workers, its conceptual starting point is very close to OSHA’s: the 
inadequacy of the traditional adjudicatory means—the tort and contract suits 
that remain available—for the horizontal task of consumer financial 
protection. These traditional means are especially constricted given the 
“procedural limitations on class actions coupled with the expanded use of 
binding mandatory arbitration.”162  
Indeed, the foundation of the CFPB was driven by the insight that sellers 
of financial products “have learned to exploit . . . consumers in ways that put 
[their] economic security at risk,” and that a structural solution to this 
predicament requires “the creation of a single regulatory body that [is] 
responsible for evaluating the safety of consumer credit products and 
policing any features that are designed to trick, trap, or otherwise fool the 
consumers that use them.”163 As the CFPB declares in its website, “[t]he 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a U.S. government agency that 
makes sure banks, lenders, and other financial companies treat you fairly.”164 
                                                                                                                     
157 Levitin, supra note 155, at 331; see also CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 2 (noting the public 
perspective prior to the CFP Act). 
158 This was not the only flaw in the pre-CFPB consumer financial protection regime. Another 
important problem was “the diffusion of regulatory responsibility [that] created regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities that fueled a race to the bottom.” Levitin, supra note 155, at 329. 
159 Notably, the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), and its authority 
to veto a CFPB regulation if it unduly risks the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial or banking 
system, are aimed exactly at ensuring these aggregative concerns. CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 22; 
Levitin, supra note 155, at 353. 
160 Cf. SINGER, supra note 115, at 92 (“We choose laws that set the minimum standards for market 
relationships.”). 
161 The proposition of the text should not be read to imply that there are no remaining difficulties. 
One particularly important difficulty in our context is that the CFPB is quite vague as to whether its goal 
is to improve consumer financial outcomes, improve consumer welfare, or empower consumers. See 
Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 39–40 (2015).  
162 Levitin, supra note 155, at 334. 
163 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) 
(alteration in original).  
164 CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Oct. 8, 
2019) (alteration in original). 
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This role is indeed central to CFPB rulemaking activity, which relies on 
a set of eighteen preexisting federal statutes—including the Truth in Lending 
Act, the Truth in Savings Act, the Fair Credit Billing Act, and the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.165 Authority over those acts has been transferred to 
the CFPB from several other regulators.166 In addition, the Bureau enjoys an 
“organic authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act,” which 
deals with “defining certain acts and practices as unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive; mandating disclosures; requiring registration of certain non-banks; 
and restricting predispute arbitration.”167  
As might be expected, some of the CFPB’s rules—such as the 
prescription that “[d]eception is not limited to situations in which a 
consumer has already been misled,” but rather covers also acts or practices 
which are “likely to mislead consumers”168—can be accounted for from both 
an aggregative and an interpersonal perspective. The significance of this rule 
to the interpersonal perspective is, of course, in supplementing the ex post 
adjudicatory model with a regulation that may more effectively prevent the 
consumer’s predicament. But other rules seem to focus on the relational 
wrong.169 
Thus, the CFPB defines an act or practice as abusive—a category that is 
the creation of the Dodd-Frank Act—if it “materially interferes with the 
ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer 
financial product or service” or if it “takes unreasonable advantage” of the 
consumer’s “lack of understanding . . . of the material risks, costs, or 
conditions of the product or service,” her “inability” to protect her “interests 
. . . in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service,” or her 
“reasonable reliance” on an intermediary “to act in the interests of the 
consumer.”170 A similar (indeed, more obvious) relational justice rationale 
                                                                                                                     
165  See Levitin, supra note 155, at 344 (listing consumer laws relied upon by CFPB). 
166 CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 9; Levitin, supra note 155, at 330, 344. 
167 Levitin, supra note 155, at 344 (citations omitted). 
168 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL 5 (2012) 
[hereinafter CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf (emphasis in original). CFPB’s 
interpretation is based on FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf. 
169 The cautious language of the text is deliberate. We do not imply that aggregative concerns are 
irrelevant even in these contexts. Indeed, insofar as its rulemaking—as opposed to supervisory and 
enforcement—activity is concerned, the CFPB is obligated to take into account net benefit (or cost 
effectiveness) as one of its considerations. See Levitin, supra note 155, at 352–53 (discussing CFPB 
cost-benefit analysis requirements); Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, Cost Benefit Analysis in 
Consumer Protection Regulation 29 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Furthermore, 
at times the CFPB may be unsuccessful in its attempt to vindicate relational justice, as the recent 
congressional resolution canceling its Arbitration Agreements Rule demonstrates. New Protections 
Against Mandatory Arbitration, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/arbitration-rule/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
170 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2012). 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   111 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
640 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
underlies the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)171—one of the sources 
of the CFPB’s transferred powers—that authorizes the CFPB to ensure that 
creditors do not “discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any 
aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age . . . .”172 
CFPB’s relational focus is no less significant insofar as its supervision, 
enforcement, and education activities are concerned. Thus, unlike the 
Federal Trade Commission, which dealt with these matters prior to its 
establishment, complaints to the CFPB do not serve merely as a means to 
“detect patterns of wrong-doing.”173 Rather, they are taken seriously as such, 
so that “companies are expected to close all but the most complicated 
complaints within 60 days.”174 Moreover, the CFPB’s supervision priorities 
also reflect a focus on risk to consumers,175 and the very same focus is also 
the first principle guiding its supervisory process.176  
CFPB’s enforcement authority (via litigation in a federal district court 
or administrative adjudication before an administrative law judge)177 may 
yield a wide-ranging set of remedies, many of them—such as refund of 
money, return of real property, and payment of damages—follow the 
traditional forms of redress to the pertinent victims.178 The recent Wells 
Fargo scandal supplies an excellent case in point. Wells Fargo Bank, one of 
the biggest banks in the United States, secretly opened two million 
unauthorized accounts, transferred funds from consumers’ accounts without 
                                                                                                                     
171 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006). 
172 Id. On anti-discrimination laws as means of relational justice, see infra note 215 and 
accompanying text. 
173 Solving Consumer Problems, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (July 2012), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0228-solving-consumer-problems (emphasis added). 
174 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Monthly Complaints Snapshot Spotlights Bank Account 
and Service Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-monthly-
complaints-snapshot-spotlights-bank-account-and-service-complaints/.  
175 See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND 
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_FY2016.pdf (describing consumer-
focused plan and strategy). 
176 CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 168, at Examinations 3 (other 
principles described are that it should be data driven and consistent). Consumer complaints are important 
triggers for CFPB examinations and enforcement (as well as rulemaking). Id. Other than that, CFPB’s 
complaint process is designed to help the consumer and the financial entity reach a just settlement. See 
generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY 1 – 
DECEMBER 31, 2015 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201604_cfpb_consumer-response-
annual-report-2015.pdf (using, overall, consumer-focused language).  
177 See Levitin, supra note 155, at 357–58 (describing remedies for violation of consumer financial 
law). 
178 Others—such as public notification regarding the violation and limits on the activities or 
functions of the person against whom the action is brought—are more public in nature. See CFPB 
SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 168, at Overview 7 (providing a full list). 
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consent, and often racked up fees and charges in the process.179 An 
investigation by the CFPB led to a $100 million fine,180 in addition to 
penalties to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the City of Los 
Angeles.181 Further, Wells Fargo was forced to pay restitution to any of its 
customers who were charged unauthorized fees.182  
The civil monetary penalty is a particularly instructive regulatory tool 
for CFPB’s horizontal task of ensuring just outcomes in particular cases: 
these penalties—as of the end of September 2017 the Bureau collected some 
$566 million183—must be deposited into the Consumer Financial Civil 
Penalty Fund, where they are “pooled” and used primarily for compensating 
“victims who haven’t received full compensation for their harm through 
redress paid by the defendant in their case.”184  
Finally, analogously to OSHA, the CFPB focuses its efforts of 
improving consumers’ financial capability by “addressing the unique 
financial challenges faced by four specific populations”: students and young 
consumers, the elderly, service members, and low-income and economically 
vulnerable consumers.185 The CFPB’s creation in the wake of the global 
financial crisis has given it something of a bully pulpit. High profile 
investigations often accompanied by congressional hearings (as in the case 
of Wells Fargo, and previously with other high-profile cases of banking 
impropriety) allow the CFPB to educate the public through publicity. The 
Bureau creates salience for the norms of fair banking, helping to bring 
consumers of financial products closer to an awareness of their rights that 
could form the substrate of a just banking relationship. 
* * * 
These two examples do not exhaust the real-life manifestations of the 
hitherto obscured relational dimension of regulatory agencies: there are 
additional agencies that are similarly relational in nature and others that are 
best characterized in hybrid terms, having significant public law and private 
                                                                                                                     
179 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 
Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, CFPB NEWSROOM 




181 See L.A. City Attorney, Protecting Consumers - Wells Fargo, L.A. CITY ATT’Y MIKE FEUER, 
http://www.lacityattorney.org/allegations-against-wells-fargo (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (announcing 
result of Wells Fargo lawsuit and linking to the Los Angeles Times report). 
182 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 179.  
183 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CIVIL PENALTY FUND: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
(2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CPF_FAQ_2017.12.14.pdf.  
184 Civil Penalty Fund, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
185 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE 
PLAN AND REPORT, supra note 175, at 5. 
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law elements. Analyzing this important subset of the apparatus of the 
modern administrative state vindicates the main claim of this Article: that 
regulatory theory should follow regulatory practice and think not only in 
aggregative terms but also horizontally. Our analysis further generates a 
preliminary account of what it means to be a relational regulator: it helps 
articulating the normative vocabulary with which such agencies should be 
evaluated and distilling a preliminary taxonomy of their characteristic 
toolkit.  
C. Thinking Horizontally 
OSHA and CFPB are only two examples of a significant subset of the 
modern administrative apparatus. But they are not outliers. Indeed, the easy 
case for horizontally oriented agencies would begin with the agencies that 
set default terms of trade for large swaths of standardized commercial 
dealing.186 The regulatory apparatus of the modern state is heavily 
implicated in regulating interpersonal relationships. Because their actions 
shape interpersonal relations, these agencies should be (and happily, often 
are) thinking horizontally.  
One manifestation of this emphasis is straightforward and can be briefly 
stated despite the minimal attention we have given it thus far. Regulators 
with private law functions take individual complaints seriously,187 even 
though most of them also have proactive enforcement powers.188 The 
                                                                                                                     
186 For just one example, consider the role of the Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural 
Marketing Service. The Agency establishes quality grading and conducts inspections dealing with safety, 
but is also responsible for “establishing and enforcing a code of fair business practices and . . . helping 
companies resolve business disputes” under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.  Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-
regulations/paca (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). Examples like this could be multiplied. 
187 Again, an illustrative indication from the Department of Agriculture:  
The PACA Division, which is part of USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS), regulates fair trading practices of produce businesses that are operating 
subject to PACA including buyers, sellers, commission merchants, dealers and 
brokers within the fruit and vegetable industry. In the past three years, USDA resolved 
approximately 3,500 PACA claims involving more than $58 million. Our experts also 
assisted more than 8,000 callers with issues valued at approximately $140 million. 
These are just two examples of how USDA continues to support the fruit and 
vegetable industry. 
USDA Files Action Against K & A Produce in New York for PACA Violations, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Apr. 
12, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.ams.usda.gov/press-release/usda-files-action-against-k-produce-
new-york-paca-violations. Some say that these agencies take complaints too seriously. See, e.g., Nancy 
M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2010) (proposing to redefine the 
EEOC’s role so that it only investigates and litigates significant claims, reducing the overall number of 
discrimination complaints the Agency processes). 
188 The exception to this rule is the National Labor Relations Bureau (NLRB), whose proceedings 
must “originate with the filing of charges or petitions by employees, labor unions, employers or other 
private parties.” NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2014 – FY 2018, at 5 
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implications of this proposition vary: the proceedings these “horizontal 
agencies” offer for dealing with complaints can either serve as (partial) 
substitutes to private lawsuits, or run in parallel to potential such lawsuits.189  
Most (but not all) of these agencies prefer to settle disputes through an 
agreement between the parties involved, namely: via mediation, facilitation, 
conciliation, or in an informal resolution.190 These differences 
notwithstanding, the simple point is that when a significant part of an 
agency’s role is to secure relational justice, it naturally aspires to provide 
satisfactory responses to relational wrongs.191  
                                                                                                                     
(2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1709/NLRB%20 
Strategic%20Plan%20FY2014-18.pdf.  
189 See, e.g., Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & EMP. COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (noting that if an individual 
plans to file a federal lawsuit “alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including 
pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, genetic 
information or retaliation, [the individual] first [has] to file a charge with the EEOC”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, FAQS ABOUT RETIREMENT PLANS AND ERISA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-
center/faqs/retirement-plans-and-erisa-for-workers.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“The Department of 
Labor enforces the law by informally resolving benefit disputes, conducting investigations, and seeking 
correction of violations of the law, including bringing lawsuits when necessary.”). 
190  See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & EMP. 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (explaining the 
pre-investigation mediation process); Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing how NLRB 
makes “every effort to facilitate a settlement between parties” if an investigation finds evidence to support 
a charge); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., LEARN ABOUT THE FHEO COMPLAINT AND 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS,  https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing 
_equal_opp/enforcement/conciliations (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing how throughout the 
investigation the FHEO “will make efforts to help the parties reach an agreement”); What We Do, U.S. 
DEP’T LAB.,  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 8, 
2019) (“EBSA’s goal in responding to requests for interpretations and other rulings is to facilitate 
compliance with ERISA, and the department’s regulations through useful and timely interpretive 
guidance to plan participants, plan sponsors and other members of the employee benefits community.”). 
But see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS 3–4, 16 
(2017) https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf (indicating OSHA is the clear exception, where 
mutual agreement is less important due to the dimension it regulates—safety and health—and there are 
some working environments that—even if workers agree to them—are too dangerous and would be 
prohibited by the Agency). As the booklet explains to workers: 
If you believe working conditions are unsafe or unhealthful, we recommend that you 
bring the conditions to your employer’s attention, if possible. You may file a 
complaint with OSHA concerning a hazardous working condition at any time. 
However, you should not leave the worksite merely because you have filed a 
complaint. If the condition clearly presents a risk of death or serious physical harm, 
there is not sufficient time for OSHA to inspect, and, where possible, you have 
brought the condition to the attention of your employer, you may have a legal right to 
refuse to work in a situation in which you would be exposed to the hazard. 
Id. at 16. 
191 A particularly clear manifestation of this commitment transpires where an agency seeks 
temporary relief in order to prevent an interpersonal irreparable harm. See supra text accompanying note 
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This is of course hardly surprising. What may seem more surprising—
at least to theorists who think about the administrative state from the 
dominant public law paradigm—is the continuity between the common law 
and these horizontal agencies. Even where they set up policies—by 
prescribing rules or setting up priorities for their supervision and 
enforcement efforts—these agencies are profoundly guided by relational 
considerations, which is of course what can be expected given their 
significant role in shaping important categories of interpersonal 
relationships.192 Indeed, the relational perspective typifies both the form and 
the substance of the norms horizontal agencies produce and follow as well 
as their characteristic toolkit of techniques. 
Regulatory agencies are often central in creating or maintaining the 
baseline entitlements that structure relationships.193 While courts often 
engage in such baseline setting as a byproduct of particularistic litigation, 
agencies do this work overtly in a manner more exposed to public 
accountability. Their rules are not side effects of settling disputes, but rather 
geared directly to setting the foundations of relationships.194 Importantly, 
administrative agencies are positioned to make structural decisions that 
courts would have difficulty formulating. In this sense, agencies have a 
wider scope in setting up the infrastructure of just relations, which courts 
typically address interstitially. 
After considering a range of agency operations, we are willing to hazard 
a preliminary classification of three modes of horizontal agency. A first 
mode of relational regulation is often oriented towards bringing participants 
into a market, which resembles that of economic models. Whenever 
regulators engage in education initiatives, publicize the rights of consumers 
or workers,195 or force firms to make information available to their 
                                                                                                                     
147 (discussing OSHA’s approach). See also, e.g., File a Complaint: Types of Complaints Investigated 
by FHEO, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_ 
offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/online-complaint#_Types_of_Complaints (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
192 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing how the OSHA “Hazard Communication 
Standard” and the SEC’s “Strategic Goal 3” are fundamentally about forcing exchanges of information 
between individuals). 
193 See supra text accompanying note 7 (introducing the concept of “regulatory contribution to the 
infrastructure of interpersonal interaction”). 
194 See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text (giving examples of how the EEOC, EBSA, 
NLRB, FHEO, and OSHA can set such foundations). 
195 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 12–13, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/agencies/osec/stratplan/fy2014-2018strategicplan.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (describing how the Department is securing “safe and healthy workplaces, 
particularly in high-risk industries,” and improving “health benefits and retirement security for all 
workers” through OSHA and EBSA, respectively); Serving Economically Vulnerable Consumers, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/empowerment/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2019). 
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employees or trading partners,196 the agencies engage in a type of 
empowerment. But this is an empowerment only to participate in a market 
with full information, without affecting its content.197  
In a second mode of horizontal agency, the regulatory work changes the 
baseline in order to take certain contracting options off the table.198 When 
regulators set minimum terms for interaction, they override (if the 
regulations have any bite) some party preferences, making at least some 
voluntary transactions unavailable (e.g., employment below safety 
standards).199 Here, the motivations may be framed in various terms; we 
have argued that a normative commitment to just interpersonal relationships 
is often the proper motivating force. Indeed, we think that there is a 
continuity between the statutory regimes on which we focus in these pages 
and classical common law doctrines like misrepresentation, mistake, duress, 
undue influence, and unconscionability.200 
Finally, the third mode of agency action lies somewhere in between the 
first two: it entails establishing mechanisms for participation in setting the 
terms of trade (especially employment). These mechanisms do not mandate 
particular minimum standards, but they do set up a bargaining venue that 
guarantees some level of representation of different interests, whose 
significance may be either intrinsic or instrumental (that is: as a means to 
affect the parties’ consensual equilibrium without directly prohibiting 
certain outcomes).201  
                                                                                                                     
196 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 37, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (citing 
“Strategic Goal 3” as “Facilitat[ing] Access to the Information Investors Need to Make Informed 
Investment Decisions”); Hazard Communication Guidelines for Compliance, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3111.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (“OSHA’s Hazard 
Communication Standard (HCS) is based on a simple concept—that employees have both a need and a 
right to know the hazards and identities of the chemicals they are exposed to when working.”). 
197 Disclosure, outreach, and publicity are examples. The goal in these instances is to prevent the 
type of exploitation liable to occur when contractors are faced by severe information asymmetries. For 
some analysts, these types of agency action may be viewed rather directly as corrections of market 
failures. Thus, while we have argued that their basis is best understood in the framework of relational 
justice, we recognize that there is a great deal of potential overlap between this consideration and an 
aggregative efficiency perspective. 
198 See SINGER, supra note 115, at 2, 19–20, 23–24, 47, 65, 68, 72, 155, 182. 
199 See, e.g., ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 123, at 99–100; see also supra note 189 and 
accompanying text.  
200 See EMMANUEL VOYIAKIS, PRIVATE LAW AND THE VALUE OF CHOICE 82, 85, 178, 195, 198, 
200–01 (2017). This mode raises important concerns of impermissible paternalism and illiberal 
normalization, which we cannot address here. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for 
Contracts § II.B (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435781.    
201 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78pp (2012) (establishing the Investor Advisory Committee, whose 
mission is to present the views and experience of a wide variety of investors and to advise the SEC on 
regulatory priorities and practices); National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety & Health 
Charter, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nacosh.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
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As may be expected, the relational form––namely: the correspondence 
between the responsibility of the regulated party and the rights of the 
agency’s class of beneficiaries––is particularly conspicuous with agencies 
that regulate, and thus participate in constructing, the employment 
relationship.202 We have mentioned this feature while describing OSHA,203 
but it appears elsewhere also.204 Indeed, it is even more conspicuous 
regarding the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), given the correlative 
relationships between its lists of employees’ rights and of employers’ 
obligations.  
Employees have the right to join together to advance their interests as 
employees and to unionize and be represented by a union of their choice.205 
Correspondingly, it is unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, 
or coerce employees in the exercise of these rights or to discourage (or 
encourage) union activities or sympathies.206 The attention to maintaining 
just work relationships makes sense of employers’ legal duty to bargain in 
good faith with their employees’ representative and to sign any collective 
bargaining agreement that has been reached. While the good faith standard 
does not mandate the content of the agreement, it announces, informs, and 
backs up a vision of relationships of mutual duty.207 
                                                                                                                     
202 The reason why it is not surprising is threefold: first, work is one of the core horizontal 
relationships in modern societies; second, the fact that the work relationship involves some entitlement 
of one person over another’s labor power makes it a particularly challenging arena for a legal system that 
seeks to ensure just relationships; finally, the categories of employers and employees are also distinctive 
sociological categories, which means that the pursuit of relational justice in this type of relationship 
largely overlaps the pursuit of democratic equality. 
203 See supra text accompanying note 141. 
204  See, e.g., Employee Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/checklists/employee_rights.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 
2019); Small Business Requirements, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/requirements.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). This 
emphasis on the relational form of the parties’ rights and obligations is not the only horizontal common 
denominator of agencies that deal with the employment relationships. They also––unsurprisingly given 
their horizontal, as opposed to vertical, or statist, emphasis––tend to extend their coverage to vulnerable 
foreign workers. We mentioned this feature while describing OSHA. See supra text accompanying note 
150. It also applies to both the NLRB and the EEOC. See Collaboration with Foreign Embassies, NAT’L 
LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/collaboration-foreign-
embassies (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ 
mous/eeoc_mexico_mou.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (providing examples of how these agencies 
extend coverage to foreign workers). 
205 Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employee-rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
206 Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/rights/employer-union-rights-and-obligations (last visited Oct. 
8, 2019). 
207  See Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employee-rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LAB. 
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Even more important for our purposes is that the interpersonal focus of 
horizontal agencies affects their actual operation. It explains, and indeed 
justifies, their priorities;208 and it underlies some of their foundational 
substantive norms. Recall that the touchstone of OSHA’s regime––its 
feasibility test––is best understood as the entailment of private law’s typical 
commitment to relational justice.209 The same commitment underlies, as we 
have also seen, the CFPB’s expansive understanding of abusive practices 
and its authority to ensure that credit applicants do not suffer 
discrimination.210 And again, OSHA and CFPB are representative of a much 
larger family of horizontally oriented agencies, which participate in the 
construction of the most fundamental rights and obligations of important 
types of interpersonal relationships. 
This feature is most visible with regard to two major agencies that deal 
with discrimination: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity in the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (FHEO). The EEOC, 
whose vision is to secure a “respectful and inclusive workplace[] with equal 
employment opportunity for all,” enforces “federal laws that make it illegal 
to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee,”211 and furthermore 
works “to prevent discrimination before it occurs through outreach, 
education and technical assistance programs.”212 The FHEO “administers 
federal laws and establishes national policies that make sure all Americans 
have equal access to the housing of their choice.”213  
Discrimination in the context of the workplace and of residential 
dwelling is a relational wrong. The public law dimensions of discrimination 
as a wrong exist alongside, but do not replace, the interpersonal aspect. As 
explained elsewhere, refusing to consider a would-be buyer of a dwelling 
merely because of her skin color, for example, fails to respect the individual 
on her own terms, in violation of the most fundamental injunction of 
relational justice. Buying and renting a dwelling (a major decision of 
self-determination) exposes people to discriminatory practices at the hands 
of some homeowners and landlords. Thus, regardless of whether the state 
takes care of its obligations—in terms of supplying sufficient housing 
                                                                                                                     
RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2019) (discussing the issue of the duty to bargain in good faith). 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 146, 175 (describing OSHA and CFPB’s priority systems). 
209  See supra text accompanying notes 131–33 (describing private law’s valuing of relational 
justice). 
210  See supra text accompanying notes 170–72 (describing the CFPB’s expansive definition of 
abusive practices). 
211 About the EEOC: Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
212 Id. 
213 About FHEO, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/ 
program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   119 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
648 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
options to all, and sustaining integrative residential communities—private 
law, being the law of our interpersonal rights and obligations, must not, and 
does not, authorize social relationships that proceed in defiance of the equal 
standing and the autonomy of the person subject to discrimination.214  The 
same analysis applies of course to the context of the workplace and to other 
forms of discrimination.215 
It is therefore not surprising that the regulatory apparatus of both the 
EEOC and the FHEO is dedicated to reconstructing these two crucial realms 
of interpersonal interaction so as to eliminate forms of unjust relationships. 
These regulations include both prohibitions and affirmative obligations, and 
they are aimed at shaping the pertinent parties’ rights and obligations in a 
way that complies with the injunctions of relational justice. The EEOC 
guidelines include, along these lines, a presumption that “[p]rohibiting 
employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary 
language or the language they speak most comfortably” is discriminatory,216 
as well as a requirement, subject to certain exceptions, that employers “make 
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability” and to “the 
religious practices of an employee or prospective employee” (e.g., by way 
of creating “a flexible work schedule”).217 Similarly, one FHEO rule 
prohibits “imposing different sales prices or rental charges for the sale or 
rental of a dwelling upon any person because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin,”218 and another prescribes that 
it is unlawful to “refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, 
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be 
necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy 
a dwelling unit, including public and common use areas.”219 
We do not deny, of course, the important public law justifications for 
these rules. Both workplace and housing integration are crucial components 
of any sustainable, let alone viable, democratic ideal of equal citizenship.220 
But the importance of these public elements does not erase the relational 
significance of discrimination. Appreciating the normative significance of 
the horizontal relation is key to articulating the difficulty where these two 
dimensions clash, as in cases where discriminatory practices are used in a 
                                                                                                                     
214 See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 50, at 1440. 
215 Id. at 1438–45. 
216 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2018). 
217 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.9(a) & 1605.2 (2018). 
218 24 C.F.R. § 100.60 (2016). 
219 24 C.F.R. § 100.204 (2018). 
220 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION chs. 6–7 (2010); JUDITH N. 
SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 79–88 (1991). 
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way that arguably promotes, rather than undermines, integration.221 It is even 
more important if it turns out that the public goal is increasingly being 
achieved. Thus, it has recently been reported that there is a sharp decline in 
residential segregation, which would significantly destabilize some aspects 
of the fair housing regime that rely on its integration rationale.222 But even 
if this development happily materializes, appreciating the significance of its 
other, relational, rationale vindicates the continuous importance of this 
regime—and thus of the FHEO. Whereas integration may be underway each 
year, according to the most recent HUD survey, “hundreds of thousands of 
FHA violations [still] take place,” which means that “[t]he struggle against 
discrimination has not yet been won.”223  
Finally, as may be expected, the relational focus affects the regulatory 
toolkit of horizontal agencies (beyond the obvious impact regarding their 
attention to individual complaints noted earlier). Our two case studies 
offered a few examples, such as: enhanced stakeholders’ participation in the 
rulemaking process;224 the availability of response in cases of imminent or 
serious breach;225 the effort to empower the typically vulnerable side to the 
relationships, in terms of both enforcement priorities226 and education 
engagement227 (including for noncitizens);228 and the availability of 
                                                                                                                     
221 See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing a 
complaint against an owner of a large apartment complex who reserved a number of units exclusively to 
white applicants in order to guard against “white flight” and maintain integrated housing conditions). 
222 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1329, 1339 (2016) (noting that there has been a decline in residential segregation, which represents one 
of the most important sociological developments in the last half century). 
223 Id. at 1375–76. 
224 See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. See also File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/ 
FHLaws/yourrights (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (explaining the process of filing a complaint if an 
individual believes the individual’s rights may have been violated). 
226 See supra text accompanying notes 146, 175–76, 178, 196 (explaining how different agencies 
use enforcement priorities in empowering vulnerable parties during dispute resolution). See also U.S. 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 
29–38 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2017budget.pdf (showing the EEOC’s plan to 
implement programs for private sector enforcement). 
227 See supra text accompanying note 149 (explaining OSHA’s outreach to vulnerable workers by 
educating them about their rights); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 
2014-2018, at 6, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/agencies/osec/stratplan/fy2014-
2018strategicplan.pdf (explaining how the Department of Labor plans to advance workers’ rights, 
particularly for vulnerable workers); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, at 3, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (demonstrating how EEOC has implemented educational programs to inform 
vulnerable employees). 
228 See supra text accompanying note 150 (explaining how OSHA has implemented programs 
specifically for protecting and informing foreign employees of their rights); see also supra note 204 
(examples of other agencies’ approaches to protecting foreign employees).  
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remedies—such  as OSHA’s self-help and the CFPB’s Civil Penalty 
Fund229—which are specifically tailored to the relational task at hand. 
CONCLUSION 
One goal of this Article is to challenge the conventional wisdom 
according to which regulators should be guided solely by the collective 
perspective of the public interest (however defined). Prevalent as it is, this 
view is descriptively wrong: a significant subset—the other half of 
contemporary administrative apparatuses—is best explained according to an 
(at times implicit) relational logic that responds to these agencies’ 
interpersonal tasks. The conventional wisdom is furthermore normatively 
misguided: although there are good reasons to associate private law with 
private litigation, many contexts of our complex social environment suggest 
that supplementing—and sometimes supplanting—private law judges with 
private law regulators would better serve the normative commitments 
underlying private law.230 
Our second purpose is to offer a tentative account of the profile of 
relational regulators, namely: of what is entailed by a commitment to think 
horizontally. We have no pretense that our account is exhaustive; indeed, we 
assume that it is partial and that further research is required to enrich and 
refine it as well as to address related topics we haven’t covered here.231 But 
we believe the beginnings mapped out here make a first substantial step in a 
promising direction.  
Part of its promise lies in the “naming” of the relational task of the 
existing horizontal agencies.232 Agencies that embrace this characterization 
of their task may improve their horizontal performance by consulting the 
preliminary relational toolkit we compiled.233 They can also inform 
themselves with substantive theories of private law—such as the one we 
                                                                                                                     
229 See supra text accompanying notes 148, 183–84 (explaining OSHA’s self-help and the CFPB’s 
civil penalty fund). 
230 One can imagine a purist theoretical position that laments these features of the modern 
administrative state. But this revisionist approach would need to acknowledge the existing horizontal 
dimensions, and thus could not purport to offer an account of the regulatory apparatus as we know it. 
231 The most immediate substantive issues that come to mind are preemption on the one hand and 
implied rights of action on the other hand. Another interesting puzzle is why conventional wisdom 
(popular and academic) has relied for so long on the incomplete and thus inadequate basis of public law 
values for justification. The puzzle might be one for intellectual historians (and on that level we have 
nothing to contribute), but it might also have a conceptual element. That conceptual element could be 
related to the challenge of thinking sufficiently abstractly about the conditions for just relations. We leave 
this somewhat philosophical reflection for another day. 
232 Cf. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980) (describing the concept of “naming”).  
233 To be sure, in many cases expanding an agency’s tools would require further legislation. 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   122 7/28/20   10:47 AM
 
2020] REGULATORY THEORY 651 
briefly restated earlier on234—in order to incorporate their more specific 
prescriptions into their decisions regarding the areas in which they already 
think horizontally.235  
Another possible payoff of this effort may come about in the context of 
agencies that do not easily fit into our prototypical aggregative or horizontal 
agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These hybrid, or intermediate, agencies 
have both aggregative and horizontal features.236 Articulating the pertinent 
putative horizontal tasks of agencies of this category can again help optimize 
the appropriate means for their realization.237  
Finally, appreciating the potential role of agencies in structuring just 
interpersonal relationships may justify revisiting the hegemony of the public 
law perspectives of some agencies that currently do not share the orientation 
toward private law we study in this Article. Indeed, even agencies that are 
properly conceptualized as aggregative may well benefit from a 
reconsideration of the absence (or marginality) of relational attention in their 
operation. A full-blown theory of relational regulation may suggest, for 
example, that fostering competition should not only be considered from a 
result-oriented perspective geared to efficiency, but also from a process-
oriented perspective, in which competition is understood as a means to equal 
opportunity that entails important elements of relational justice.238 This and 
                                                                                                                     
234 See supra text accompanying notes 50–51 (explaining the substantive theory of private law 
earlier discussed). 
235 Another potential direction may relate to the training of the pertinent personnel, although one 
may assume that the recruitment and training practices of horizontal agencies—or, rather, the particular 
horizontal departments of these agencies—are already adjusted to the task at hand.  
236 Thus, the FTC, in addition to its mission to promote competition, is empowered to protect 
consumers by defining acts or practices as unfair or deceptive. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2018, at 3, 6 (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2014-2018-strategic-plan/spfy14-fy18.pdf. 
Likewise, the SEC is responsible for both maintaining “fair, orderly, and efficient markets” and 
protecting investors. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 3, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). Another 
agency that may fit this category is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which in many ways 
resembles aggregative agencies. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 2014-2018, at 
i (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM416602.pdf; 
cf. Keating, supra note 128, at 202, 231 (discussing how the “safe-level standard” the Agency applies to 
food security can hardly be justified in aggregative terms). 
237 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2018, at 6–7 
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2014-2018-strategic-plan/spfy14-fy18.pdf 
(noting how one possible “horizontal deficit” of both the SEC and FTC is that neither aims at resolving 
individual complaints; rather, they both use complaints primarily to detect patterns of wrongdoing); How 
Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last modified Jan. 27, 2017) (discussing the sources from which 
the SEC “obtains evidence of possible violations of the securities laws). 
238 See Hanoch Dagan, Between Regulatory and Autonomy-Based Private Law, 22 EUR. L.J. 644, 
644 (2016) (explaining how this may be the raison d’être of the EU principle of access justice, which 
underlies a significant subset of the European regulatory private law). 
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other potential reformist implications of our effort in these pages239 must 
wait for another day (and maybe other authors). 
 
                                                                                                                     
239 The full reconstructive potential of a theory of private law agencies should question also the 
basic structure of the regulatory apparatus. It may imply that insofar as this subset of the administrative 
state is concerned, one should design the architecture of the universe of agencies based on a taxonomy 
of our interpersonal relationships. 
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